Sudan and China (Guest)

 by: Danny J. (Guest Contributor)

The following piece does not necessarily reflect the views of chinacomment. However, it is interesting, so I hope you will find it enjoyable. Once again, I thank Danny very much for his contribution.

Last month, Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir was recommended to be arrested by Luis Moreno-Ocampo, a prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC). Days before the actual announcement, China’s UN ambassador expressed concern, arguing Bashir’s indictment could hurt possibilities for peace in Darfur, a western region of Sudan. Sudan’s UN ambassador responded similarly, saying the arrest would lead to ‘grave consequences’. ICC judges are not expected to make a ruling on Bashir’s arrest until October or November, so it is not an imminent threat. (Note: There are currently no Darfur peace processes on the table.) 

Sudan and China have a fairly good relationship, but during much of Sudan’s North-South civil war, Sudan and China only had limited ties. 

Even after al-Bashir came to power in a June 30, 1989 coup, Sudan’s primary business during its Civil War period was with Western countries. It was not until the late 90’s and early 2000’s that American and European companies, for the most part, pulled out due to domestic human rights lobbying and Sudan’s internal unrest. Talisman Oil, a Canadian Company completely left Sudan in early 2004 following several pipeline bombings – it was one of, if not the last remaining Western oil interests in Sudan. 

As the West was pulling out, China dedicated more and more to Sudan, and Africa. Currently, China has large investments in Sudan, both commercially and politically. Regarding Oil, China is ‘leading developer of reserves in Sudan,’ and currently takes between 40 to 80 percent of its production, or about six percent of China’s total oil imports.

 

The Indictment and China’s Policies

 Once al-Bashir’s indictment was officially announced, the Sudanese UN ambassador is said to have sought help with Security Council members China and Russia. By July 13, both UNSC members informally pledged support to Sudan’s government. As of July 31, China urged the UN to suspend the indictment of Bashir.

 The African Union, Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of Islamic Conference have all called for invoking ‘Article 16,’ a measure that allows the UNSC to suspend the ICC proceedings for 12 months, renewable indefinitely. The US, on the other hand, is firmly against freezing the indictment.

 Even with an arrest warrant, it is unlikely that Bashir would be easy to get, considering that two other arrest warrants were issued last year, and both targets still remain at large. Yet, the warrant on al-Bashir may result in positive action toward resolution of the Sudanese situation. ‘Western diplomats say Mr. Bashir could escape indictment if he ended what they see as impunity for two men the ICC charged last year over Darfur.’ This presents a way out for Bashir, but should he do so, the move would probably be viewed as bargaining sovereignty for safety.

 So, why do Russia and China support Bashir and Sudan? The main reason is Sovereignty. Internationally, China acts in a ‘treat others how you would like to be treated’ sort of way. It has done this in two ways over the years.

 First, imagine what China would do if a high ranking Party member were indicted by the ICC. A member would more than likely never get to that point, since China possesses a UNSC veto, but in the current situation, China can even avoid the potentially embarrassing situation of having to cast a UNSC veto. In this way, the Party solidifies the power it holds over its people, ensuring that there can be no one above the state, in much the same way the USA’s refusal to join the ICC protects its sovereignty. The state has the last word.

 A second example of this type of action regards how China previously addressed Sudan’s problems in Darfur and the civil war in the South as issues Sudan must deal with alone. Think of southern Sudan and Darfur as provinces in China like Xinjiang, Tibet, or Taiwan. China occasionally has problems with these regions. If secession by these regions were to happen to China, it would want support for its policy of ‘unifying’ itself. Therefore, China argues that Sudan’s internal ‘territorial problems’ should be ‘solved internally.’

 

 Military Aid to Sudan? (Where Exactly is it Coming From?)

 For a time, this meant even militarily helping Sudan. The BBC reported that ‘Dong Feng Military Trucks,’ ‘Chinese anti-aircraft guns,’ and ‘Fantan fighter jets’ have been sold or given to Sudan by China, in possible violation of a UN arms embargo. The BBC believes that some equipment arrived before, and some after the embargo, and that the Chinese are training Sudanese to pilot the jets (yet another breach of the sanctions).

 China maintains it does not sell weapons to countries on the ‘embargo list.’ However, a new report was just released naming China as the top violator of the Sudan embargo.

 One problem with this report was that it just names ‘China’, not differentiating whether the actor violating the embargo is official government policy, the military acting of its own accord without the Center noticing, or the embargo is being broken by smuggling of Chinese Arms.

 It is possible the Chinese government (like other weapon-producing countries) sold the Sudanese government arms legally before the embargo, then other sales were made after the embargo (with or without official permission) by people and groups with access to the equipment.

 

 Chinese Peacekeepers … Demonstrate Beijing is Honoring its Commitments

 Still, China has helped make some positive action in the last two years. Last year, China began pestering Bashir into accepting UN troops and other decrees to prevent further problems in Darfur. The UN peacekeeping troops are foundering, but not because of China. It is because other countries fail to send the number of troops they pledged. (The current number of peacekeepers is around 9,100, with a pledged total of 26,000.)

 China has sent most, if not all, of the troops it committed. Considering how understaffed the peacekeeping force currently is, China’s fulfillment of its promises is more than many other countries can say.

 

 Concluding Remarks

 As with everything, the relationship between Sudan and China is complicated. For both countries, the positives are great: Beijing gets more oil and another African supporter of ‘One China’; Khartoum gets money, at least some of which goes into modernizing the city and to a much lesser extent the country.

 Unfortunately, weapons sales also play a part in the relationship, whether official or unofficial. This has helped exacerbate the conflict in Sudan (to be honest, even without Chinese arms, Sudan still would have gotten guns and Darfur would still be a problem) and made China lose some international face.

 Sure, China dragged its feet in the beginning of the UN peacekeeping process, but that is the general nature of Chinese foreign policy: wait until you have to act, then act. In this case China balanced and preached noninterference, but changed position and acted when negative international PR threatened China’s face/image.

 Still, it is important to commend the Chinese for convincing Bashir to allow peacekeeping troops, and for sending many troops themselves. There have been successes and failures, but China’s interaction with Sudan demonstrates how China is beginning to accept international responsibilities while maintaining dialogue, economic relations and involvement with its Sudanese friends.

Guest Contributor Danny J. has a BS in Political Science and International Studies with a focus on China and its politics. He lived a year in China and visited places, from Urumqi to Beijing to Yunnan, to list only a few.

(Note: Chinacomment is currently on vacation and without constant access to computer until the beginning of September; however, updates will continue at the pace of 1-3 a week since Chinacomment does have a sizable backlog of relevant material to post.

Also: Happy 08-08-08 08:08!)

John McCain’s China Policy

If John McCain, the presumptive American Republican Party presidential candidate wins in November 2008, his China policy appears to be one of seeking to maintain positive relations while attempting to convince China to become a responsible stakeholder in international affairs.

McCain’s voting record in the Senate indicates a relatively benign attitude toward China-US relations, but his recent campaign rhetoric indicates he might take a harsher line toward China. Then again, President Bush was harsh on China when he came into office, and that shifted sharply once he came to believe that although it might be popular to malign the country, the US might benefit by cooperating with the Asian state.

The often-quoted Yan Xuetong of “Qinghua University says Chinese-U.S. relations might be more stable under a McCain presidency than with either Democrat.”

I invite you to look below and come to your own conclusions about McCain’s statements on China.

CHINA DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

In (1999), McCain said that “we need not shrink from a strong advocacy of religious and political freedom [in China].” Shades of this statement were echoed McCain’s his April 2008 comments in regard to Beijing’s response to unrest in T*b*t; “If Chinese policies and practices do not change, I would not attend the opening ceremonies… It does no service to the Chinese government, and certainly no service to the people of China, for the United States and other democracies to pretend that the suppression of rights in China does not concern us. It does, will and must concern us.”

(All three Presidential candidates echoed similar statements regarding attendance of the opening ceremonies.)

McCain went on to urge China to engage in “a genuine dialogue” with T*b*ts spiritual leader. McCain said: “I have listened carefully to the D@l&i L&ma, and am convinced he is a man of peace who reflects the hopes and aspirations of T*b*t*ns.” He went on to say, “I urge the Chinese authorities to ensure peaceful protest is not met with violence, to release monks and others detained for peacefully expressing their views and to allow full outside access to T*b*t.”

DIPLOMACY AND ECONOMICS

He promotes economic engagement with China (1999), and voted for normalized trade relations with China in 2000. He appears to be a “free trade” Republican who believes that lowering barriers will increase democratization, make others wealthy and lead to peace. It appears McCain subscribes to the Thomas Friedman’s “Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention” (Scroll down to see the definition).

However, in recent years, his statements in regards to China have turned more belligerent. In response to unsafe toy scandals in April 2008 McCain said “If I were president of the United States, the next toy that came into this country from China that endangered the lives of our children, it would be the last,”

McCain also implied that “the G-8 should be limited to democracies,” according to a Bloomberg article reposted on The China Post, which implies he would keep China, and Russia out of the world’s major economic decisions. The economic and political wisdom of keeping some of the most powerful economic powers away from the discussion table is a bit murky. Perhaps pressure-tactics might encourage a change in attitude by the countries- but that remains to be seen.

It appears McCain is willing to confront Beijing on issues such as their support for Myanmar (Burma) and China’s continued trade dealings with Sudan. As he said in May 2008, “”I would hope” Americans would sell stocks and other investments tied to Sudan, McCain told reporters… “because I think that government obviously is one that has done virtually nothing to prevent the genocide that is taking place in Darfur.”

His comments are a bit odd, coming as they did soon after China sent over 140 engineers and troops to Sudan, but it is a fact that China’s promotion of Sudan’s “national sovereignty” has resulted in it pushing for watered down UN votes sanctioning Sudan over its treatment of the minorities in the Darfur region.

CHINA AND TAIWAN

“Guarding against Chinese threats to our strategic interests in Asia is a sound rationale for helping reduce the growing threat to Taiwan from a mainland missile attack” (1999).

Considering McCain’s interest in East Asian security, it is likely he will support the continued de facto independence of Taiwan. He would unlikely, however, support de jure independence, seeing as he has previously spoken of a “One China” principle.

CONCLUSION

John McCain appears willing to challenge China on shoddy imports, and human rights. He also appears willing to seek to maintain American military interests in the region and may subscribe to a view that America’s long-term world-competitors are large states rather than small. This would encourage him to expand the size of the professional military, and perhaps purchase a larger amount of F-22s.

If McCain speaks most belligerently about China, it will be in regards to T*b*t, or Taiwan. While he has been noted for his compassion for the Sudanese people, beyond the stock sell-off he has had little to say directly on the subject.

Of course, American forces in East Asia are currently being drawn down as troops are moving gradually from  South Korea to Guam. The drawdown of US troops could ameloriate Chinese fears of American encirclement.

McCain would try to keep the trade levers open between the countries, believing trade would be mutually beneficial. McCain’s past record is of promoting economic policies that satisfy China, and benefit America by creating a more efficient supply-chain. These policies do much toward peacefully co-existing with the Chinese State.

It appears that a McCain presidency, though potentially confrontational in regard to Chinese human rights and shoddy merchandise, would tend to reflect George Bush’s status quo of criticising China, while still increasing trade, and working toward dialogue. That is, if the OLD free trade McCain overcomes the populist G-8 and dialogue-limiting McCain that has appeared in the 2008 election cycle. If the new, more belligerent McCain crafts China policy, then pressure and stresses might develop in the Sino-US international relationship.

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* The major source article for this analysis was the CFR’s analysis of Presidential Candidates’ China views.

* John McCain’s major foreign policy article in Foreign Affairs is “An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom.”