China Comment

Energy, Environment, and Economy

Post-Olympic Pieces

Here’s a couple of interesting “Olympic-Aftermath” posts from around the internet, and below is some value-added analysis:

* The Olympic Sponsor – Biggest Winners and Biggest Losers
All Roads Lead to China
Discusses how sponsors like Lenovo and GE may have benefitted from their Olympic sponsorship.

*Yeah! I’m a Llama Again
Silk Road International
Great Olympic-review/overview piece with even better links that are worth consideration. (Such as this harsh piece by TimesOnline (Some of its assertions might be treated with a grain of salt though- and it should be noted that the British Times appears to have an almost pathological dislike for China’s regime), and a thoughful piece in the Washington Post.)

* The Great Convergence?
The China Beat
Compares similarities between China and the United States and coverage of the Olympics.

* Making sense of what comes after the Olympics
Michael Pettis at Asia EconoMonitor
Discusses China’s still-weak stock-market, declining growth in expansion of tax revenues, and speculates on near-future performance of the Chinese economy.

*Rio Tinto predicts post-games boom
By Rebecca Bream and Chris Flood; Financial Times
The Financial Times reports how Rio Tinto believes commodity prices will rise again, amid a post-Olympics construction boom as transportation/supply chains are untangled, factories are reopened, and trucks get back onto the streets… This would probably happen starting sometime around mid-September after the Paralympic Games are finished.

Olympic Pollution: Comparisons
chinacomment
If you wanted to compare pollution pre-Olympics, or to compare Beijing’s pollution to Olympics’ pollution in Athens, or Barcelona, this is an excellent resource.

Wireless Data Roaming Wins Gold During Beijing Olympics
MarketWatch
Ever wondered how much information was sent over roaming phones during the Beijing Games? Now you can become enlightened. “[A] surge in wireless data roaming traffic exceeding 40 percent over the same period of days the month before. This increase in roaming traffic resulted in more than 332 GB of data being exchanged between 225 mobile operators in 106 different countries on the Aicent network. This increase in wireless data roaming is the equivalent of the content in books stored on nearly two miles of shelves.”

Conclusion… What Does This Mean?
Links without analysis are only of marginal use, so here’s some value-added content.

* Rio Tinto is probably right to believe demand in China for metals and resources will continue, despite a weak international economy. And if other countries’ demand for resources drops, China has the cash to step in and bargain-shop.

* A weaker international economy will harm China’s export-market, but the PRC appears willing to focus policy on expanding economic growth. Brad Setser of the CFR (Council on Foreign Relations) persuasively argues that China’s exports have not yet been significantly harmed by the global slowdown.

It appears RMB appreciation will slow if the Chinese continue to prop up their exporters. Michael Pettis, who specializes on Chinese Financial Markets and teaches at Beida in Beijing, believes that China might also sustain high inflation in order to support its exporters.

It is surprising that exporters are still maintaining at least a limited amount of strength, considering that the new Labor Law requires employers to pay workers more and treat them better, and considering that new tax provisions do away with some benefits for foreign companies based in China. A fuller examination of China’s economic future and the consequences of its economic policies definitely merits more in-depth future analysis that will certainly take a good deal of time to properly treat.

* And The China Beat reminds us that in many ways, China and the United States have similarities… things that often go unnoticed when the “China Threat Theory” is promulgated, or China’s collectivist culture is over-stressed, or when commentators focus on China’s “communism.”

* And, to close, I welcome your thoughts on where China’s economy is going post-Olympics or if the Olympics really changed anything about China in the long run. (Bonus Article: “Orville Schell discusses the future of Chinese nationalism and Olympic changes. (Written Before the Games)”) Thanks for reading.

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29 August, 2008 Posted by | China Economy, China Future | , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Xinjiang’s Energy Resources

Resources buried under Xinjiang account for over 20% of China’s future petroleum reserves, over 40% of its coal reserves, and Xinjiang has potential for large uranium deposits. Recent terrorist attacks and instability in Xinjiang makes it worthwhile to examine just what the Chinese have of interest in the region. Below, I explore the importance of Xinjiang’s security to Beijing’s energy policy. (Examination of a political point-of-view calculation will have to wait until later.)

An Overview of Xinjiang’s Energy Resources

“Xinjiang’s annual oil and gas equivalent output… ranks the first in the country… The third national resources evaluation shows that: Xinjiang’s total oil and natural gas resource reserves exceeded 30 billion tons… Recently, Xinjiang has been producing 75,000 tons of crude oil daily, occupying 14.4 percent of the country’s daily crude oil output. In 2007, Xinjiang’s oil and gas equivalent reached 44.94 million tons” which was the highest production value of all Chinese provinces” (People’s Daily).

“Xinjiang produced 26.4 million tons of crude oil and 21.2 billion cubic meters of gas last year, or 43.3 million tons of oil equivalent, representing a rise of 13.6 percent from 2006. [Note, these estimates differ slightly from People’s Daily’s estimates] As a result, Xinjiang, with estimated reserves of 20.8 billion tons of oil and 10.8 trillion cu m of gas, has been designated as a strategic area to replace Heilongjiang [in the Northeast] in China’s oil industry” (Stephen Blank, Jamestown).

“[B]eneath Xinjiang’s dusty soil and mountainous steppes lies buried 40% of China’s coal reserves. Equally abundant and far more precious to the central government are oil and natural gas deposits that total the equivalent of about 30 billion tons of oil and represent one-fourth to one-third of China’s total petroleum reserves” (Peter Navarro).

* A short, four page report on Xinjiang’s energy potential by the WSI (World Security Institute).

Xinjiang’s Coal

“It is predicted that during the 11th Five-Year Program period (2006-10), in the Zhundong area of eastern Xinjiang, the total installed capacity to be constructed – based on coal resources there – will reach 8.8 million kilowatts, and that of coal-to-methanol, coal-to-olefin, and coal-to-oil projects will total 7.6 million, 1.96 million and 3 million tons respectively. The aforesaid projects are expected to generate sales revenue of some 55 billion yuan (US$7 billion) after going into production… In 2006, raw-coal output in Xinjiang increased by some 3.6 million tons over 2005” (Asia Times).

“In accordance with the region’s 11th Five-Year Program, by 2010 Xinjiang’s raw-coal output is expected to exceed 100 million tons, and its installed capacity to top 10 million kilowatts” (Asia Times). 

Xinjiang’s Natural Gas

“The Tarin Basin alone has proven reserves of over one billion tons of crude and 59 billion cubic meters of natural gas” (Martin Andrew, Jamestown Foundation).

Xinjiang’s Wind

Xinjiang is also home to the Dabancheng wind farm, one of the largest in China, and has potential for much more wind power expansion. And “The Ala Mountain Pass region… will have an installed base of wind farms totaling 1 GW” by 2015 (Renewable Energy World).

“(Although significant power-grid transmission to the East would be a logistical problem to overcome.) “Currently, the total wind power capacity installed in Xinjiang accounts for 20% of nationwide capacity installed… The total capacity is estimated to reach 43.8 million kW, which can generate 1 00 billion kWh of electric power and is nine times of the current electric power generated in Xinjiang” (World Security Institute).

Energy Security and Transportation

* “The 2008 People’s Republic of China (PRC) White Paper on Diplomacy placed energy security as a major centerpiece of the country’s foreign policy…The White Paper specifically emphasized that China is currently the world’s second largest producer and consumer of energy, and therefore an indispensable part of the global energy market, and is increasingly playing a prominent role in ensuring global energy security” (Russell Hsiao, Jamestown).

* “Central Asia can serve as a transshipment area for Middle East oil should war ever break out over Taiwan or China’s various claims for oil reserves in the South China Seas” (Peter Navarro). Pipelines through Xinjiang connect China with Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan (2010), and also run through Uzbekistan. It is vital to China’s energy security that these energy pipelines are secured.

* Crude Oil reserve bases are also located in Xinjiang, which will be useful if coastal oil reserves in Zhejiang or Fujian come under fire due to a Taiwan conflict.

* Xinjiang’s vast resources can help China wean itself off of foreign countries’ energy. If developed properly, and if China restrains its energy consumption, the country can continue to possess a modicum of energy independence.

Conclusion

Security of Xinjiang’s resources is central to Beijing’s strategy of becoming a developed nation. Without Xinjiang’s resources, the Chinese would depend even more on the vagaries of the Malacca Strait for transshipment of energy. Russia’s new pipeline into China will help alleviate some of China’s dependence on pipelines through Xinjiang, should said pipelines become plagued by sabotaguge (which is unlikely). Additionally, more energy diversification is planned with expansions of China into Myanmar energy.

Still, China’s domestic energy hub for the future is Xinjiang. Its supply of energy to the rest of the country is disproportionate to its population and its wealth. Because Xinjiang is key, China will continue to be harsh in its crackdowns against splittists, terrorists, and overly zealous religion adherents.

27 August, 2008 Posted by | China Energy, China Future | , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Protesters and the Olympics (Guest)

by: Danny J. (Guest Contributor)

There is one group who the Western media has generally not quite given much face-time, a group who could potentially cause even more embarrassment to Beijing than the Tibet and Darfur protesters. This group is China’s general population of ‘petitioners.’

Beijing is said to have been home to 10,000 petitioners before the Olympics. Many of these people came to Beijing to petition because they believe they have ‘been denied justice in their home provinces.’ These people could expose untold numbers of stories of local corruption, and at least some of the stories would be true.  Now, groups allege there has been a large crackdown that has swept petitioners, along with other undesirables such as ‘beggars and pickpockets’ out of the city. Also, to discourage undesirables (the poor, migrants, Uighurs, 等等) from residing in Beijing, the government ‘closed down thousands of cheap hotels and basement apartments where rooms could be rented for less than $1 a day’ and ‘demolished housing in entire neighborhoods where petitioners have lived.’

Anyone who has lived in Beijing is probably familiar with this sort of tactic, the clearing off the street of beggars before a big event – be it a Party Congress, or the Africa-China meeting. This time, however, the clearing is being done with an ‘unprecedented intensity.’

One common petitioner spot known as Kaiyang Bridge had somewhere around 10,000 petitioners before the crackdown. Now it only holds a few hundred. Such petitioners wish to have their problems heard, hopefully in front of a television camera. Gauging Beijing’s reaction so far, it is a bit unlikely that their problems will be heard before they are detained.

High profile protests have already begun. Pro-T^&(t activists unfurled some huge banners near the stadium, ‘others managed to screen a pro-T^&(t video, a U.S. swimmer unveiled an anti-fur advertisement and three U.S. Christian activists were able to enter T*(ananmen Square to protest briefly.’ No one was arrested, although it appears that all save the anti-fur swimmer were deported on the 9th, but all were quickly quieted and removed from their protest sites.

For something to look forward to, there are the ‘more than 40 athletes’ who signed an ‘open letter to china’s government to respect human rights and freedom of religion.’ Protests have also started and have been ongoing, to some extent, in many parts of the world.

What all this will lead to in the aftermath of both protests and the Olympic games, and whether or not the Chinese government can respond appropriately to unrest and dissent, might very well shape future Chinese domestic and foreign policy.

(ed: in the August 19, 2008 WSJ, page A10- Shai Oster noted in “China is Pitching a Protester Shutout” that 77 applications for protests from 149 people have been filed. 74 were withdrawn “because their problems ‘were [allegedly] properly addressed by relevant authorities…’ No protests have been approved. This could lead to simmering discontent among the people as Leslie Hook describes on page A15 in “The Chinese Want Property Rights Too.” In that article, Hook describes several petitioners’ struggles.)

Specifically of note (and for deeper analysis): Willy Lam of the Jamestown Foundation wrote a good article on the “Coming crackdown” post-Olympics games.

This piece does not necessarily reflect the views of chinacomment. However, it is interesting, so I hope you will find it enjoyable. Once again, I thank Danny very much for his contribution.

(Note: Chinacomment is currently on vacation and without constant access to computer until the beginning of September; however, updates will continue at the pace of 1-3 a week since Chinacomment does have a sizable backlog of relevant material to post.)

18 August, 2008 Posted by | China Future, China General, China Stability | , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment

Kuznets & China’s Pollution

Prognostications are often suspect, but here’s an alternative view in juxtaposition to the usual gloom and doom regarding the threat posed to China by its air and water pollution.

Still, pollution in China is definitely a problem. It leads to over 750,000 premature deaths each year in China, according to a World Bank report. (656,000 air pollution-related deaths, and 95,600 water-related deaths.) “Of the 1,300 Chinese rivers surveyed in 2004, 40.6% received a quality rating of grade IV or V, and 30% of the river water monitored by the Chinese government is grade V.” A rating of IV indicates that the water is unfit for human consumption. Grade V is not even acceptable for agricultural or industrial use (Anna Brettell, 158. In Guo, Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development, 2007).

However dire the current situation is, it is similar to the troubles suffered by America and other countries during the Industrial Revolution and in its wake. But, the problems exist on a much larger scale, since China has more people.

For comparison purposes; as of 2007 in the United States over 41,000 people a year  (0.00014 % of 300M) are estimated to die prematurely due to air pollution (Also see WHO comparisons for 2002). (Other estimates place the 2007 US mortality rate at between 22,000 to 52,000 and speculate that this amount must have dropped significantly in the past 30 years since “the US Environmental Protection Agency reported a decline of 25% from 1970 to 2001 in 6 principal air pollutants: carbon monoxide, lead, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter.” The best data I could find on prior US mortality rates was cited HERE, and argued that in 1991, 60,000 a year in the US succumbed to early death due to air pollution. (1990 US Population=250M, so 0.00024%) (* See End of Article for full citation). This past higher number implies that improvements in pollution mortality rates can be made in a relatively short period of time

In India, 527,700 perish each year due to air pollution. (0.00044% of 1.2B) In China, the amount is 656,000 (0.00050% of 1.3B). 

The US (1948), UK (1952), and Japan, with its Minamata disaster, suffered environmental problems in their manufacturing boom-eras with higher percentages of pollution-related deaths than they currently sustain. What changed in these countries? The passage of legislation such as Clean Air acts in the United States (1962) helped regulate pollution. As people became more aware of pollution’s deleterious effects, they became more motivated to regulate and end it.

Through an abstract theory, it can be argued that China has good precedence for being able, like the US, Europe, and Japan, to mitigate its pollution problems. The “Kuznets Curve Theory” states that as societies modernize, “Pollution will begin to decrease after a country reaches a per capita GDP of between US $3,000 to US $5,000” (Anna Brettell, 155 in Guo Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development, 2007) (other articles state $8,000) . This decline in pollution can be attribuitable to 1.) Awareness, 2.) Improvement in technologies for energy efficiency, 3.) A shift away from manufacturing to cleaner industries.

China’s GDP per capita, in Purchasing Power Parity, for 2007 was ~$6,700 according to the UN Human Development Reports, but according to the CIA it was $5,300. (I believe the CIA may be using the updated numbers after China’s PPP was readjusted around December.)  

In constant dollars, China’s GDP per capita in 2000 was $846 US… by 2007 it had grown to $2,200 US. The Chinese expect to reach $3,000/capita around 2010 (China Daily). If China maintains current +10%/year growth rates, per capita GDP could reach $6,000 by 2020 (It should be noted that China’s GDP statistics are often called into question for being over-estimated; for ease of discussion, I’ll take the official stats at face value.)

Once basic necessities are provided, and economic growth secure, people can afford to deal with pollution externalities that threaten their long-term health.

Environmental NGOs and Environmental Activism in China

In 2001, there were only 39 registered environmental NGOs in China. By 2005, there were over 2000, according to Elizabeth Economy at the CFR (Council on Foreign Relations).

Environmental consciousness is rising, and the State is allowing it to perpetuate. In 1990, citizen environmental complaints were a “mere” 140,681. By 2004, over 726,192 instances of people sending letters and visiting the Environmental Protection Bureau were recorded; a 410% rise over 1990. The number of incidents leading to those visits and letters rose from 111,359 in 1991 to 682,744 in 2004 (Brettell in Guo, 156).

And these letters and groups are having some effect; “The decision in late January 2005 by SEPA Vice Director Pan Yue (with the support of Premier Wen Jiabao and the State Council) to bring to a halt 30 large infrastructure projects including 26 power-related projects on the grounds that environmental impact assessments were not properly completed suggests strong support within the top reaches of Beijing for NGO activity in this realm” (Economy).

 What Does This Mean?

China is in the midst of a pollution crisis. But if its situation is similar to that faced by countries elsewhere around the world, its amount of pollution is nearly at an apex, after which, in China’s wealthier and better-developed coastal provinces, pollution will decrease.

By examining the situation through the lens of the Kuznet’s Curve, it appears that China’s has nearly reached the ~$6000 per capita/PPP amount necessary to facilitate development toward cleaner industries and technologies. China’s recent expansion of its Environmental Ministry represents a step in the direction of a cleaner environment and less pollution.

I prefer to use PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) for comparisons since PPP presents a good way to compare costs of living in different countries. Therefore, I argue China is due for a major anti-pollution push. In a few years, with the assistance of its new Environmental Ministry, and barring any extreme energy crisis necessitating sustained reopening of unclean coal mines, China will get even more serious about enforcing its pollution laws. So, from 2010 and through 2012, prepare to see some major improvements to China’s environment– for the better.

ALSO; The Economist talks about China and India’s differing approaches to dealing with pollution.

World Bank 2007 comparative charts on pollution in countries and cities around the world.

Extra Notes: (see above *) * according to an “Air Pollution in Typical U.S. Cities Increases Death Risk,” press release dated May 13, 1991, from the Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, Mass. describing findings later reported in Joel Schwartz and Douglas W. Dockery, “Increased Mortality in Philadelphia Associated With Daily Air Pollution Concentrations,” AMERICAN REVIEW OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE Vol. 145 (1992), pgs. 600-604.”)

and  [Brettell, Anna. “China’s Pollution Challenge.” 155-193. In Guo. Challenges Facing Chinese Political Development, 2007.]

* AEI did an excellent article on China and the Kuznet’s Curve.

13 August, 2008 Posted by | China Environment/Health, China Future | , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Other Challenges

Last week, I discussed John Pomfret’s Washington Post article that described challenges China faces to becoming a superpower.

What Is A Superpower?

In comments on my site, and on the China Law Blog, Here and Here, several readers indicated it would be useful to define “superpower” when discussing China’s future propensity for achieving “superpower” status.

The debate about what defines a “superpower”, whether it is a high ranking on the Human Development index, whether it is equivalent or not to “hegemon”, whether it is “force projection”, or merely “military” or “economic” force, is quite expansive.

For the purposes of my post, I’ll take a simplified position. From what I gather, when the hoi polloi (common people… the laobaixing 老百姓) discuss “superpower” or what makes a nation great, they mean an entity that can project its force overwhelmingly and has the ability to influence geopolitical events on a worldwide scale. Other countries need to plan around this country’s policies. In that sense, the United States and the USSR were “superpowers”; to some degree, the economic Japanese juggernaut was a superpower in the late 1980s and 1990s. Increasingly, China is becoming an economic superpower.

While I acknowledge this definition can be debated, I hope to keep the definition simple so I can move into the point of the post.

Another issue perhaps worthy of consideration is that my article and Pomfret’s did not set a timetable on when China might achieve said “superpower” status. I assume Pomfret was taking Keidel’s statement of China surpassing the US in total GDP around 2030 as the date most people assume for China’s arrival at superpower status.

In listing possible challenges facing China, I’ve tried to base statements on the time horizon of 2020-2025, shortly after the sixth generation of PRC leaders comes to power. One inspirational source was the roundtable discussion of Cheng Li, Pieter Bottelier, Fenggang Yang, and David Lampton in “China in the Year 2020.” 

China’s Challenges

To continue its rise to an economic and soft power status that can “shake the world” by 2025, China’s pressing challenges include a need to ensure energy supplies, tame inflation, confront environmental degredation, deal with dissent/protests/petitioning by instituting a rule of law and providing social services.

Below, I briefly cover these ideas. Eventually, I hope to deal with these challenges at length– a lot of good articles and books have been written on all of them and they are all large issues and deserve more treatment.

Energy Supply Maintenance

China will require 11.6 to 12.3 million barrels of oil a day, up from 6.9 million/day in 2005, and around 7.5 million/day in 2007, and allegedly 8 million/day in 2008 (according to IEA-2004 and DOE-2005 estimates, respectively (Kreft, 2) and more recent energy statistics.) Nearly 75% of this capacity will have to be imported since China can only produce around 3.7 million/day domestically.

China could also experience a deficit of 620-770Mt/a of coal in 2020 alone, according to He Youguo in a 2003 report by China Coal Industry Development Research and Consulting Co. Ltd. (7).

If current trends continue, Herculean efforts at ensuring an uninterrupted energy supply will need to be undergone to ensure that the lights stay on at China’s factories.

More on China Energy:  Nuclear Power, Wind Power, Natural Gas.

Taming Inflation

In 1989, part of the impetus for the protests was runaway inflation, rising unemployment and lowering standards of living. And as Pieter Botellier also argued; “the Communists’ defeat of the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war of 1945-1949 was greatly assisted by the run-away inflation of those years, which sharply reduced the popularity of Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China (ROC) government. “

China’s economic system today, however, is more sophisticated. Still, this is the highest inflation we’ve seen in China since the mid 1990s, with over 20% price hikes on food and double-digit growth in gas prices.

Currently, policy priorities appear to be toward promotion of economic growth rather than inflation containment. Arguably, maintaining growth could contribute more toward long-term stability. Still, if growth only goes to the middle and upper classes and the poor bear the brunt of inflationary increases, and their lives stop becoming noticably better- and their standard of living stagnates… there may be problems. Every year, China’s ranking on the GINI coefficient, which measures wealth distribution, becomes increasingly unequal. Currently, China’s GINI hovers between .37 and .46 (depending on measurement), either slightly more equal than the US’ GINI rating, or much less equal.  

Environmental Challenges

China faces severe environmental challenges. Pomfret, Economy, and other experts have discussed this in detail. For China to continue 10%+ yearly GDP growth, it will have to clean up its polluting industries. According to China’s Green GDP, in 2004, pollution cost China at least 3% potential growth. The Green GDP numbers for 2005 were never released, and arguably China’s pollution increases every year.

Energy efficiency per unit of GDP improved 3.66% in 2007, and arguably should improve this year as energy-intensive factories are shuttered. But, partially due to rising car ownership, pollution expanded significantly in the 21st Century. China hopes to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP 20% by 2010, but it is a little behind its goal of yearly reduction percentages. Small coal mines and plants have been shut to ensure compliance, but to avoid power disruptions, many mines have recently been reopened.

Stability and the Rule of Law

China could arrest dissidents en masse, growing more repressive, but this will increase tensions in its relations to the outside world, and might stifle ideas and innovation.

However, as China’s economic influence becomes felt around the world, it is possible that it might set up its own international framework in competition to the West’s APEC, WTO, and IMF. (See the last section of my article on Maslow’s Hierarchy and Rule of Law- Not Human Rights for more info.)

With sovereign wealth holdings of over $1.7 trillion, China has extensive ability to affect the world… Unless of course, that wealth becomes tied down in foreign non-performing assets, declining currencies, and a need to invest in overpriced resource markets.

China is a giant in terms of wealth, so it can take quite a beating in economic losses from its funds, but poorly performing assets can lead to public opinion backlashes.

Without strong development of a domestic consumer economy, China will have difficulty in existing isolated from international economic forces.

Providing Social Services

Pomfret identified China’s demographics, its aging, and its peak of a working age population around 2015 as being a large problem. I rebutted that. However, with China’s GINI coefficient rising (at increases of 6%, the fastest in the world for the past decade), and with a degrading environment, and 350 million smokers, perhaps 1/3 of the world’s total smokers, health care costs will rise and create public tensions if the government fails to aid sick people.

Fear of these tensions could be a reason the Party prevents cross-provincial NGOs from organizing, and is cracking down on Sichuan post-earthquake support organizations and people who threaten to challenge the Government’s handling of the incident.*

Crafting an efficient social safety net, or preventing unrest in response to lack of said net, will be an important challenge for future Chinese administrators.

* Note: I realize this particular person, Huang Qi, has a history of challenging the state which might lead it to be more repressive. However, the point still stands; the state has harassed and/or  paid off families not to complain about allegedly faulty construction that may have caused more schools to collapse than should have if codes were followed.

Conclusion

To solve its many challenges, China could turn inward and become repressive, or turn outward and allow development of civil society, or it could mix the practices. While some commentators might paint China’s future as that of a “negative” (closed-society) or a “positive” (democratic society), both I and the commentators in “China in the Year 2020” tend to see opportunities from many points along the choice continuum.

China could “succeed” in achieving superpower status even in spite of democratization. Or it could fail to achieve said status even despite democratization and liberalization. 

Once again, I welcome your comments regarding challenges China’s development could confront in the coming 20 years.

* On August 25, 2008, The Wall Street Journal presented its own ideas about which challenges China faces. (Inequality, Resources, Population/Aging).

5 August, 2008 Posted by | China Future, China Stability | , , , , , , , , | 5 Comments

China’s Nuclear Power Expansions

On August 1, China raised its planned development of nuclear power to account for 5% of China’s total energy mix by 2020 instead of the previously projected 4%. This would account for over 60 GW of power.

” The country would boost the development of the nuclear power industry by speeding up construction of nuclear power plants in the coastal areas and drawing up plans for the inland regions, said Zhang Guobao, director of the newly-established National Energy Bureau.”

As part of the development of new nuclear energy sources, on July 18, approval of development for a reactor on Hainan Island in Changjiang County was confirmed. China National Nuclear Corp. will construct the reactor.  “[I]t is expected to come into operation in late 2014.” And, interestingly it is claimed that, “more than 70 percent of the plant’s equipment will be manufactured in China.”

Currently 1.3% of China’s energy (9 GW) comes from nuclear energy, originating from 11 reactors.

Further Reading on China’s Nuclear Industry: China’s Nuclear Power, Uranium Update.

2 August, 2008 Posted by | China Energy, China Future | , , , , | 3 Comments

A Weak China?

In the Washington Post, John Pomfret, former WP Beijing Bureau Chief and author of Chinese Lessons: Five Classmates and the Story of New China (2006), argues that China is not going to become a superpower. His argument is a bit misleading, however. He demonstrates that China faces challenges, but he admits China’s GDP will outpace the United States’ in size. 

Pomfret’s four challenges, while intriguing, appear to be the wrong challenges to address. Despite them, China will still become a superpower. In this article, I explain why his challenges are not the most apt. Then I suggest four different challenges to China’s growth.

Pomfret calls attention to four challenges; “dire demographics, an overrated economy, an environment under siege and an ideology that doesn’t travel well.”

Dire Demographics… But Room for Expansion

Pomfret successfully argues “that as the working-age population shrinks, labor costs will rise.” In China’s coastal provinces, labor costs have already risen, partially due to reduced migrant labor flows. It is also true that after 2013, China’s labor force will peak at 900 million and subsequently the elderly will be more numerous than adolescents and children. And there are nearly 119 males born for every 100 females, which will create tensions.  

But, it is also true that despite decades of posting productivity gains, China is still underutilizing its human capital. Its workers have not yet realized the full potential of productivity gains that workers in other countries have realized- which means that China still has a vast, untapped potential for growth.

Chinese labor productivity has grown from (in 1995 RMB values) around 5000RMB per worker in 1979 to 21,500 RMB per worker in 2005 (or roughly $3100). (Holz, 166 and He & Kuijs, 6) And productivity grew at around 8.7% per year from 2000-2006. (The OECD defines Labor Productivity as GDP per hour worked) The US Labor Productivity value-added per worker is currently ranked sixth in the world by the OECD, behind Luxemborg, Norway, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Belgium.) 

Japan and South Korea, which similar to China started at a low base for productivity, are currently at 71% and 41% of US productivity ratings. Regrettably, it appears these OECD numbers have not been adjusted for PPP (Purchasing Power Parity). However, the point remains, South Korea had low productivity and a majority of citizens employed in agriculture back in the 1960s. Now, only 7.5% of its population works in agriculture.

China still has up to 43% of its population employed in agriculture (due to the nearly 200 million migrant workers who retain rural residencies, the number is probably more like 30%, but that is still an overly-high number). This underutilization and underemployment of workers demonstrates China still has much room to grow, and many more productivity gains to realize– its rise is not yet finished.

Overrated Economy… But Massive Purchasing Power

Pomfret rightfully criticises Keidel at the Carnegie Foundation for a July 2008 extremely pro-China growth article. Keidel assumes China will maintain over 7% yearly growth rates through 2030. These estimates may prove to be overly optimistic. However, China’s economy is still deregulating and expanding. It may not grow as fast as Keidel assumes, but barring massive inflation and energy shortages, the sheer amount of human capital and potential for development will allow it to expand at a healthy clip.

Pomfret wanders a bit into strange territory when he argues China cannot become a superpower simply because GDP per capita is so low. But why does low per capita GDP preclude development of a strong country? If GDP is high enough, China can finance a modern military, and its state-owned businesses can purchase overseas energy and mineral resources.

With even modest GDP growth, the domestic market can serve a middle class of perhaps 400 million (or 100 million, depending on the estimate), which is larger than almost all Western countries’ populations! If China is a giant in terms of worldwide trade, it can have greater influence in trade contracts with countries like Brazil and the Central Asian nations, marginalizing the United States.

Note: In later articles I hope to explore China’s middle class, its productivity in detail, and how China’s aging might effect domestic policies. I would love to go into greater detail on these items here, but then this post might become thesis-length. 

Environmental Problems… A Legitimate Challenge; But It Can Be Overcome

Pomfret is correct that China faces environmental problems. Elizabeth Economy and other scholars have detailed this in numerous books and articles. And environmental pressures can cause societies to implode, as Jared Diamond famously argued in Collapse.

However, China may be able to make fighting its pollution an opportunity for societal and technological development. China could allow NGOs and private groups greater chances to challenge local development and expose corrupt practices. Or, China could continue to suppress cross-provincial border NGOs, and could fail to develop technological innovation. The future of China and its environment could be dire, as Pomfret believes, or it could be positive should Chinese invent innovative environmental solutions (See Prospects for China’s NGOs for more info on Chinese NGOs).

Bankrupt Ideology… But The Country Is Just Now Developing Its “Mission” (See Maslow’s Hierarchy)

Pomfret’s argument about China’s ideological intellectual bankruptcy is interesting. He makes a good point about how China’s one-party system can stifle innovative thoughts. But China is still developing its mission, and there may come a time when China’s ideology can be successfully exported. (Please see the last section of my article on Maslow’s Hierarchy).

In contrast to the United States’ private think tank minds, and European NGO leaders, China has yet to produce many world-respected political theorists to propogate its philosophy. Its famous discursive-thinking thinkers and personalities; Wu Jinglian (economist), Bao Tong (politician), and Gao Xingjian (author) are either retired, marginalized, or living in exile.

(Note: This is not to say China lacks independent thinkers; CASS (The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) has been known for producing innovative thought. And University scholars such as Shi Yinhong have done innovative work in regards to foreign policy. But in one example of stifling creativity, the State closed the innovative Journal “Strategy and Management” when they felt its authors strayed too far from the party line; Other thinkers contribute valuable intra-China thoughts on nationalism and how China should relate to the rest of the world, but Chinese views on how the world should be ordered internationally are less often elucidated, and have less of a world-wide impact. China has also long taken a non-voting and non-leadership position on the UN Security Council.)

Conclusion

Pomfret is right, China faces challenges. But these challenges are not dire enough to hobble its rise to global superpower status. Only the environmental challenge appears to be a potentially growth-derailing problem, and it could yet be overcome.

In response to Pomfret’s proposal, I suggest a few different problems China is facing that may delay its rise. To succeed as a superpower, China most needs to ensure energy supplies, tame inflation, deal with dissent/protests/petitioning by instituting a rule of law, and provide social services. (If the last two items are combined, then I would list Pomfret’s “environmental” challenge).

I hope to explore these problems in a future article and would like to hear your opinions on what four problems you believe are most important for China to overcome.

(My further response, based on your feedback, is here).

30 July, 2008 Posted by | China Economy, China Future | , , , , , , , | 11 Comments

Brazil’s Passage To China

The BRICs are getting cozier.

In 2007 Brazil finally experienced a trade deficit with China. “Brazil’s official figures show its China-bound exports totaled $10.75 billion in value in 2007, with imports from China reaching $12.62 billion,” according to Xinhua. ” 6 percent of all Brazilian exports went to China last year, while 10 percent of all imports came from China,” according to NPR.  Bilateral trade rose 71.7% in 2007. Trade between the two took off between 2000 and 2003, when trade rose five-fold, and then again from 2004-2007 when trade more than doubled (BBC).

In 2007, the United States, Brazil’s #1 trading partner, exported $24.6 billion to Brazil and imported $25.6 billion; however, China may soon supplant the United States and Argentina in trade importance to Brazil.

In Brazil’s July-launched China Agenda program, the Brazilian Foreign Trade Secretary spoke of hopes to triple exports to China by 2010, which would account for $30 billion. This could mean that by 2011, Brazilian-China trade could surpass US-Brazil trade. However, I think that is unlikely, as I explain below.

China Supplies Mfg. Goods, Brazil Supplies Raw Materials

“96 percent of Brazil’s Chinese imports are high-value manufactured goods, 74 percent of its exports to China are low-value commodities such as soybeans and pig iron,” according to the AP.

According to Agenda China, Brazil hopes to increase exports of 619 product lines, including “Brazilian pharmaceutical products, chemicals, plastics, shoes and metals, as well as expanding the array of agricultural goods, through a higher Brazilian presence at trade fairs and through visiting delegations of businessmen” (AP). Brazil currently has three consulates in China. They are located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Xianggang (Hong Kong).

Implications

Brazil supplies raw materials China will require, such as iron. However, it is difficult for Chinese ships to reach Brazil, which could feasibly increase transport costs. They only have three options; a sea route (through Panama), another sea route around the tip of South America, or perhaps a land/sea route that would need extensive development before it could be widely feasable.

Of the three, transport through the Panama canal is by far the quickest (by days). The planned increase in Sino-Brazilian trade will make it even more vital that Panama’s expansion of the canal (to serve larger ships) is completed by 2014. (Panama Canal Expansion Proposal)

“The current locks are 33 metres (108 feet) wide, but the new locks would be 50 metres (150 feet). A third lane of traffic would be able to handle the wider loads” (BBC).

There are fears, perhaps over-stated, by some in American Ports, that US ports are not prepared to handle the newer large class of ships that can transverse the channel. If US ports are not dredged deeper, the US will lose a percentage of trade to the Venezuelan, or Brazilian economies.

Given the current fuel-price increases and the necessity of long journeys for goods to be transported from Brazil to China, I consider it doubtful that Brazil will increase exports to China three-fold in the next two years. Although the countries have demonstrated an ability to increase trade, the current economic slowdown and Chinese resource investments in Africa and in Australian companies will make purchases from Brazil of less immediate importance.

Trade will increase, since both countries’ are growing despite global difficulties, both will experience slight drags on expansion due to the global slowdown. This will ultimately make unattainable Brazil’s three-fold growth in trade to China .

After 2014, however, with the Panama Canal’s widening, all bets are off. In those circumstances, Brazil-China trade could certainly increase, perhaps exponentially.

* An interesting blog post from MarketOracle on the Brazil-China trade (crica, Feb 2007)

16 July, 2008 Posted by | China Diplomacy, China Economy, China Future | , , , , , , , , , | 7 Comments

Natural Gas – Development

Beijing continues its quest to fill its increasingly high energy needs since demand is up 8.6% in 2006, which is a staggering amount compared to global growth rates of under 2%. To mitigate the problem, Beijing plans to ambitiously expand natural gas supplies.

China’s natural gas industry is growing at a rapid pace. 2007 saw 23.1% growth and this year, Natural Gas output will “likely hit 76 billion cubic meters,” on around 15% a year growth!). 

International agreements signed from 2003-2005 are finally coming on-line, and new agreements are being made. Below, I examine what this can this mean for China’s energy security and future geopolitical purposes.

First, for orientation purposes; 1,200 cubic meters of gas equals about one ton of oil (People’s Daily); or a conversion rate of 8.3×10-4.  (Conversions will vary between sources depending on how oil companies rate the density of materials, but for simplification purposes, all numbers below are approximations.)

In 2006, China received 69.6% of its energy from Coal (1.19B tons of oil equivalent in 2006, but 2.5B “natural” tons of coal are expected to be consumed in 2007)^, 21.1% from Oil (350M tons; 183.7M produced domestically, around 47% imported), 5.8% from Hydroelectric, 2.7% Natural Gas (55.6B cubic meters- in 2007 this rose to 69.8B cubic meters), and 0.8% from Nuclear Energy [data from: Rosen (17), and China Daily (2006)]

To make the data easier to compare, cubic meters have been approximately converted into tons:

Tonnage and Percent of Energy Mix (2005-2006)

Coal

1,190M  

69.6% 

Oil

350M

21.1%

Natural Gas                                

 58M*               

 ~3.5%*

 * Roughly converted into tons, thus is estimated down from the 69.8B cubic meters as per the formula explained above. Also, Natural gas data is for 2007.

^ 1 m.ton of coal = 4.879 barrels of crude oil equivalent (Source)
(Chart Data from Rosen and China Daily; 2005 and 2006 numbers except as stated.)

(2009-2010) – New Sources of Imports Coming on line

The Chinese government hopes to double use of Liquid Natural Gas from 2.5% of the energy mix (as of 2005) to 5.5% of the energy mix by 2010, and expects to utilize 200B cubic tons a year (166M tons, or roughly half of current oil consumption) of LNG by 2020 (IHT).

China is fast approaching its goals. In order to facilitate foreign imports, pipelines are being built, and China National Offshore plans to build an additional 10 LNG (Liquid Natural Gas)-capable ports (CER).

In August 2007, PetroChina and Chevron agreed to develop the Luojiazhai natural gas fields in Sichuan. The fields are believed to hold 2.03 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves (57,483,144 cubic meters or roughly 48M tons.) (CER).

In July 2008, PetroChina proclaimed “Sulige Gas Field in China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region” can now produce  4.5 billion cubic meters (steres) a year (3.8M tons). By the end of the year, Petrochina hopes to increase output to over 7 billion cubic meters (steres) annually (5.9M tons) (China Institute).

Turkmenistan will be able to export Natural Gas to China, starting in 2009. Under an August 2006 deal, China plans to purchase 30 billion cubic meters in 30 years; averaging to 1 billion cubic meters, or around 833,000 tons a year. 

In June 2008, China signed a deal with Qatargas Operating Co. for delivery, starting in 2009, of 2 million metric tons of LNG annually (CER).

TOTAL: (2009) 8.9M tons yearly
Sulige Gas Field (5.9M yearly) [2009] (Inner Mongolia)
Qatar (2M yearly) [2009]
Turkmenistan (833,000 yearly) [2009]
Luojiazhai Fields (43M reserves) [~2010] (Sichuan)
 

Long Run Forecast

In July 2008, Kazakhstan started a natural gas pipeline (IHT) that should be “completed by June 2010.” When finished, it will carry 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year, or around 38M tons.

Sinopec also has high expectations for the Dayi Gas Field in Sichuan. They claim possible natural gas reserves of 100 billion cubic meters (85M tons) (China Institute).

China also, in June 2008, signed a cooperation agreement on natural gas extraction and transportation with Myanmar, which has over 5.7 to 10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (283,168,199,078 cubic meters; or 238M tons) (China Institute).

In a July 10, 2008 statement, “Russia plans to export 68 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China annually by 2020 [58M tons], the president of the Russian Gas Union said. Valery Yazev, who is also deputy chairman of the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, said that Russia planned to supply up to 30 million metric tons (220 million barrels) of crude oil to China via a branch line of the East Siberia – Pacific Ocean pipeline (ESPO)” (China Institute).

TOTAL: (2020) 96M tons yearly
Kazakhstan (38M yearly) [2010-2015]
Russia (58M yearly) [2015-2020]
Dayi Field (85M reserves) [2010-2012] (Sichuan)

 

Geopolitical Security

Future pipelines from Kazakhstan will carry imports that equal half the amount of LNG consumed by China this year. As a result, Central Asian security will become more integral to Beijing’s foreign policy. The pipeline from Kazakhstan crosses Uzbekistan and goes through China’s sometimes-volatile Xinjiang province. New pipelines originating from Central Asian countries will require more People’s Armed Police patrols to guarantee safety, which will tie down a modest amount of troops since the lines present an energy security vulnerability. Anti-terror crackdowns  will  increase in Xinjiang, and possibly Islamic Mosque worship will be more restricted. (Children under a certain age are not allowed in Mosques; although when I visited, it appeared this practice was not entirely enforced.)

Also, Beijing will strengthen ties with the SCO (Shanghai Cooperative Organization) economic and defense grouping of Central Asian states, perhaps attempting to marginalize the United States’ regional influence. Beijing already surpasses the US in trade partner significance to several Central Asian States, trading $12 billion in 2006 (CRS, 71) with the region, compared to 2006 US trade of slightly over $2.3 billion with the region.  (Data from HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE, and HERE for exports; HERE for imports)

With a future pipeline to Myanmar, Beijing might increasingly coddle that regime, like France and Russia at times did to Baghdad in the leadup to the Iraq War.  However, given Myanmar’s undeveloped economy, it may be years before they practically exploit their natural gas. An Indian and a South Korean company are also involved in the explotation. The Myanmar issue will prove to be a complicated one, geopolitically.

Ultimately, Natural Gas is but one of several sources for China’s energy, and it will only account for 5.3% of Beijing’s energy mix by 2010. Coal is currently, and will remain the most important piece of Beijing’s energy plan for the next twenty years. And oil will remain the most vulnerable part of Beijing’s energy plan, since over 47% of China’s oil demand is imported.

Still, the importance of LNG will cause Beijing to bring in foreign experts (such as Shell, and Chevron), and will increase its influence in the Central Asian states. It will be interesting to see how relations and rights negotiations develop over the next two to ten years, given energy prices’ recent fluctuations.

 * Some conversions attempted using this chart and this one. Also of note. “Steres” is another word for “cubic meters.”

Also of Note: Daniel Rosen and the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ AMAZING analysis of China’s Energy Future –  http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/rosen0507.pdf

* China’s Nuclear Power, Wind Power in China.

14 July, 2008 Posted by | China Energy, China Future | , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Beijing Smog

Every winter, Beijing skies darken with pollution’s gray fog. Exercising becomes dangerous to the health since too much bad air is drawn in and and not enough good. Soot merges with Beijing’s snowfalls, solidifying the snow and making these dense packed black and white masses last.

Beijing’s foul air contrasts greatly to air quality elsewhere. Good air, which rates a 50 on the AQI (air quality index) means air absent of “ground-level ozone, particle pollution, carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen dioxide,” according to airnow.gov. When air rates over 150, it is considered unhealthy and a red pollution day is declared. Several American cities experience red, or purple (201-300 AQI values) pollution days a few times per year. Beijing’s index, by contrast, suffers over 110 days each year in excess of AQI 100. Several days in December 2007, air quality hit 500- meriting a hazardous maroon rating (US air quality scale).

In Winter 2006 and 2007, the pollution index also hit 500. On those days, we could not even see buildings less than a block away. Bleakness oozed. Chinese wore white face masks.

“Beijing lung”, our endearing term for hacking up black spittle, became a common sight and ailment among not just foreigners, but also among locals. People felt dizzy, lethargic, and disoriented. Food took on a slightly tinny tinge, and eyes watered.

Is Beijing’s polluted clime livable- yes. As bad as my description sounds, thousands of Beijingers more or less live, and work- hanging 30 stories off construction beams, or carting bales of cardboard and crushed plastic on precariously balanced bikes. According to a New York Times article by Aaron Kuo-Deemer, hospital visits and deaths do rise significantly during high pollution days. But it is amazing how much pollution the human body can withstand. Even though just walking on a 500 level pollution day feels like smoking several cigarettes, one recalls some heavy smokers live long lives. In fact, Jeanne Calment, the world’s oldest lady smoked until she was nearly 117. Other smokers at least live into their sixties.

But living a relatively healthy life among increasing pollution is not sustainable. Pollution cuts into productivity as asthma cases increase and lung diseases strike, creating pressure on China’s health care system. Last year cancer accounted for nearly 20 percent of Chinese deaths, according to China Daily. Estimates state “70 percent of China’s 2 million annual deaths attributable to the disease were pollution-related,” according to China’s State Environmental Protection Administration; also “a World Bank report said about 750,000 Chinese die earlier due to air pollution every year.”

The situation, despite government claims to the contrary, may be worsening. Although Beijing can celebrate an alleged 244 blue sky days where the pollution index remained below 100, part of the reason for the achievement attributes not to greater environmental sustainability, but to movement of monitoring stations to new locations- farther away from highway intersections.

Cleaning up sulfur-spewing factories and particulate-emitting coal plants, Beijing has progressed in reducing airborne particulate matter. However, with over a thousand cars added daily to Beijing’s streets, automotive pollutants are merely replacing industrial pollutants. Although Beijing has made great strides in improving car and bus emission standards and although it has increased mass transportation, opening two subway lines, and a light rail in 2007 and 2008, Beijing’s rapid growth and unfortunate location negate much of its environmental gains. Smog originating from northern provinces’ factories blow into Beijing’s dry mountain-surrounded plateau and is trapped. The dust only dissipates with a rain or strong wind. Otherwise, bleakness looms.

Despite recent environmental advances- the preponderance of cars, influx of people and high energy demands will contribute to increased pollution. Beijing will grow and the government will struggle to limit pollution. People will endure, but as the city grows, so too will the dark clouds looming above.

Economist Quotation

 (This article was originally written in March 2008 )

10 July, 2008 Posted by | China Environment/Health, China Future | , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

The Visible Hand of China in Latin America

Off the Shelf:

The Visible Hand of China in Latin America (2007), edited by Javier Santiso of the OECD, is a great pamphlet with a lot of hard data about China’s role in that part of the world.

While much is often stated of China’s trade surplus with the rest of the world, China actually ran a trade deficit with Latin America for much of the 2000s. China is the continent’s third largest trading partner, after the United States.

Eduardo Lora opens the book with a discussion on whether Latin America should fear China. From the data he presents, the answer appears to be “not yet.” He points out several economic weaknesses faced by China.

1.) Allegedly, China still has poor corporate governance and inefficient state-owned companies. Lora notes that the amount of state-run underperforming assets has massively declined over the years, but he makes much of the nonperforming loans and debt that burdened Chinese banks until restructuring and bank sheet balancing resulted in NPLs at only 9.5% as of late 2006. Considering how flush with reserves, investment and other cash China currently is, and how their companies are modernizing business practices, I do not think corporate governance questions is necessarily a crippling problem for China to overcome with investments in Latin America… especially when compared to indigenous Latin American companies’ problems with inefficiency and corruption.

To back up his assertion, Lora goes on to argue (27) that the three largest firms in main economic sectors are state owned and that China is propping up 30-50% of those firms as “national champions” by giving them loads of state support so they will become globally competitive multinationals by 2010 (27). He argues this will lead to inefficiencies.

For comparison for how strong China’s companies are. As of 2007, China managed to get eight companies into Fortune 500’s World’s Most Admired Companies (The US had 135; Japan, 61; Britain, France, and Germany, 26 apiece) . A good amount of the top companies, however, are state owned. [I find it odd though that Huawei, Lenovo, Haier, Baidu, and Galanz were not listed as admired companies– a lot can be said for them as Donald Sull (2005) discussed in Made In China.] And indeed, being listed on Interbrand’s listing of Top Global Brands still escapes Chinese companies. As of 2007, China still had no companies on the list (Here’s the report). The Best China brands are examined here. An easy chart of them is here.

2.) Lora gets a bit technical by discussing how China’s financial system is still undeveloped (28-30). Keep in mind though that a lot he discusses as being undeveloped has evolved since his article was written (in late 2006). He complains how until 2006, foreigners could only buy nonvoting B-shares in several sectors (infrastructure, utilities, and finiancials). Now, he says foreigners can purchase A shares, but to ensure stability they are required to buy over 10% of shares and hold for longer than 3 years. Lora argues this lack of easy-foreign investment will eventually damage Chinese companies’ ability to efficiently expand. (Then again, China has a lot of money even within its country, so maybe it will escape these problems.)

3.) Allegedly 50% of GDP (31) is locked up in savings and investments. Lora states this could be good, but it prevents capital and labor from moving to the most efficient sectors.

4.) Lora points out that 40% of private entrepreneurs with companies that have incomes over $120,000 USD are CCP members (31). This could be a neutral comment, or it could imply possibility that corruption rather than efficiency might govern China’s future capital markets.

Lora then discusses weaknesses that are shared between the countries:

5.) Weak higher education. (More on that in a later article)

6.) Corruption/Weak Rule of Law

As of 2007 there were 122,000 Chinese lawyers at one per 10,650 people [In the US the ratio is 1 per 270]  (“Chinese Seek a Day in Court”, WSJ, July 1, A12) but most judges are retired from the PLA and lack legal expertise.

I don’t particularly believe Lora’s view that China’s companies are doomed to not meet expectations of world-dominance, since China is confronting many troubles he identifies. However, the points he raises have at times been overlooked by people willing to too-quickly crown China the next world hegemon.

Chapter 2, by Jorge Blázquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodríguez and Javier Santiso discuss whether China’s markets complement or threaten Latin America’s.

China’s export-mix competes the most with Thailand, Hungary, and Mexican goods (53). Costa Rica also, to a lesser degree, faces competition (54).

Brazil and China are highly complementary in trade (55).

In a chart on (54), Santiso excellently documents, through use of his own data tables, how Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Columbia and Argentina have very little competitive overlap with China.

Mexico and China share interest in IT, consumer electronics, clothes, and manufacturing. Transportation equipment is Mexico’s only advantage.

Latin America allegedly has too inefficient ports, so they cannot gain in transport cheapness vis-a-vis China in trade with other countries and regions. Customs are too slow, taking up to seven days on average to clear across the region. However, Latin America will still not be overly burdened by China competition since the two regions specialize in different products.

Latin America, for example, gains in trade to China by sending copper, oil, soybeans, and coffee.

According to the article, “in 2004, 1/2 of Chinese FDI went to Latin America, exceeding the 30 per cent that went to Asia (70).” I’m not sure that’s completely true and will have to consult my other sources, but it bears examining, because it’s quite interesting, given all the media attention lavished on China-Africa relations.

In essence, Santiso concludes that “China will benefit other emerging economies in [Latin America in] the long term.” “Latin America faces few if any short-term trade costs” (55), except in Mexico and Costa Rica, of course.

Chapters 3-5 were okay, but didn’t reveal too much of immediate interest. The pamphlet-book is a good read, and I’ll recommend it even though it is fast getting out of date. There simply aren’t that many good articles/books written on China-Latin America relations, but of the ones that do exist, Santiso’s is certainly a gem.

OTHER RESOURCES

* Mohan Malik, writing for PINR has a digestable version of Sino-Latin American Relations.

* There is a 2005 CRS Congressional report on China’s influence in Latin America.

* PBS had a radio program on China-Latin America ties. One Brazilian disagreed with Santiso’s statement that China benefitted the Brazilian economy. He called attention to textile competition.

2 July, 2008 Posted by | Book Review, China Business, China Economy, China Future | , , , , , | Leave a comment

China’s Nuclear Power

In February 2008, construction began on the Ningde Nuclear Reactor in Fujian province. According to China Daily, the reactor should cost around $7.1 billion to construct and will open for generation in 2012. Yearly, it will generate 33 billion kWh of power (3.3 GW). Ningde is just one of China’s nearly 30 reactors planned to be constructed between 2008 and 2020.

China is embracing nuclear energy. However, China’s nuclear industry is still nascent. Compared to France’s 59 operational reactors, and Japan and the United States’ 55 and 104, respectively, China only has “11 nuclear reactors currently in operation” and six under construction as of June 2008. These reactors “last year generated 62.86 billion kWh [6.2 GW], up more than 14 percent on 2006… [N]uclear power still accounts for less than 2 percent of the country’s total output… [But China] wants to boost this figure to 4 percent by 2020,” according to China Daily. By 2010, China plans to have 12 GW online. As of 2008, China can generate 9 GW a year.

China’s planned amount of nuclear power as a percentage of their energy mix (4 percent) amounts to an insignificant amount compared to nuclear’s predominance in the United States. In the US, nuclear power accounts for “20 percent [of power]… and nearly 80 percent in France,” according to the Washington Post. 

It does not appear nuclear energy will become a significant source of energy insecurity should future geopolitical problems arise between China and foreign countries. Coal remains the main ingredient in China’s energy mix.

In 2020, the Chinese hope to have nuclear power capacity of 60 GW. Also according to China Daily, China “will need to start construction on about 4 new generators a year through 2015 to meet its ambitious target.”

WILL CHINA MEET ITS TARGET OF ADDING NEARLY 50 GIGAWATTS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN 12 YEARS?

 China needs to satisfy a few strategic areas before they can have a strong, functioning nuclear industry.

Uranium Acquisition– China purchases uranium from Kazakhstan  and signed an agreement with Australia (2006). Imports of uranium account for 700-800 tons of the 1,600 it consumes yearly. Its uranium needs should expand to 4,000 yearly tons in 2010 (according to Bloomberg) and then 8,000 tons a year by 2020, according to AFP.

According to China Daily, more domestic exploration will be undergone. “Key areas that would be scoured for natural uranium include the Yili Basin in” Xinjiang and parts of Inner Mongolia. NTI has a chart of existing Chinese uranium mines and supplies. “China has [at least] an estimated 57,000 tons of uranium in the [already explored] south.” In 1995, the OECD estimated China’s readily-extractable uranium supplies at 65,000 tons, according to NTI. A 2007 Bloomberg news report estimates China’s domestic supplies at 300,000 tons, but that’s probably optimistic even though Chinese geologists are discovering new sources, mostly located in China’s border provinces. The location of these uranium deposits means that the Chinese government will have an even greater desire to increase border and internal security in these provinces.

IAEA data on country-by-country estimated recoverable uranium reserves are available HERE. China is estimated to only possess 1% of the world’s available reserves. Australia (24%) and Kazakhstan (17%) account for the lion’s share.

To reduce China’s reliance on uranium imports, it has established a strategic reserve for uranium. The reserve should be completed by 2010. According to the IHT, “China is building storage tanks in Zhenhai, Zhousan and Qingdao and in the northern city of Dalian.”

Enrichment Expertise– China has been aggressive in pursuing nuclear energy independence. In May 2008, Russia and China signed an agreement for a $1 billion investment in the completion of a gaseous centrifuge enrichment plant. The completion of the agreement, by 2010, should bring the Russian constructed capacity of Chinese Uranium enrichment plants to an ability to process over 1,600,000 SWU (Separative Work Units) per year. Compared to other countries’ capacities for enrichment in 2003; China’s amount will still be low. Russia, for example, can enrich over  25,000,000 SWU a year. The US can enrich 11,300,000 a year, and Japan can enrich 1,150,000 SWU a year.

Equipment– China has several indigenous nuclear power equipment plants being constructed. The most recent was built from June 2007-June 2008 in Shandong province. The plant produces steel containment vessels, according to a Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao article. Its “annual output volume is able to meet the demand of two sets of generating units in the AP1000 [type] nuclear power plant. ”

Reactor Designs– China is attempting to develop its own reactor design, so it will not have to transfer technology from abroad. According to the Washington Post, “Groundbreaking for an experimental $416 million Chinese plant is scheduled for 2009.”

Operational Expertise– China “is relying heavily on Western contractors such as Westinghouse to teach its engineers to build and operate plants,” according to the Washington Post. In December 2006, US-based but Japanese Toshiba-owned Westinghouse signed an agreement to build four new 3rd generation plants in China.

Waste Disposal- China plans to deposit its nuclear waste in the Beishan Mountains in Gansu province near Dunhuang, according to the Washington Post and The Asia Times. The repository will not be opened until 2050. Before China can begin transporting spent fuel to its interior, it will need to upgrade rail lines and security.

Conclusion– China’s nuclear industry faces a number of challenges in becoming self-sufficient and self-sustaining. It will also likely not be a major player in the country’s total energy supply until after 2020, since it will account for so little of China’s total energy supply (Around 4% of the mix). 

Beijing will probably need to confront Uranium supply dearths more aggressively, whether by beginning massive domestic extraction investments (with all the environmental destruction and populace dislocation that may involve) or increasingly seeking investments abroad in places that can supply said Uranium, such as by going back into Niger and more aggressively exploring resources in Australia.

Currently, China lacks the technical expertise to completely self-develop their nuclear energy program, as Xinhua admits. However, after 2020, when China’s capacity is expanded, Chinese indigenous reactor designs, expertise and operators may become players on the world market and the Chinese could be exporting their expertise elsewhere in the world.

APPENDIX

Chinese Nuclear Reactors

 Chinese Nuclear Reactors (From The World Nuclear Association)

 

The above map suggests more nuclear reactors are soon planned for the north of China; however, by examining actual work orders, all power plants planned to be built before 2015 are in China’s south.

After 2015, one reactor should be operational in Shandong, with several others under construction.

Chinese Nuclear Power Companies (Partial List)

China National Nuclear Corp.

China Guodian Corp. (also produces other types of energy)

Chinese Nuclear Reactors (Partial List)

Coastal/South

* Ningde Nuclear Reactor in Fujian (construction begins– Feb 2008; planned open– 2012)

* Sanmen Nuclear Reactor in Zhejiang (construction begins– 2007; planned open– 2011)

* Daya Bay (2) in Guangdong (~2 GW) (1994)

* Lingao (2) in Guangdong (~2 GW) (2002, 2003) (Expansion Planned)

* Yangjiang in Guangdong (Planned)

* Qinshan (5) in Zhejiang (~3.1 GW) (1991, 2002, 2002, 2003, 2004) (Expansion Planned)

* Tianwang (2) in Jiangsu (~2 GW) (2007)

* The World Nuclear Association has a more technical indepth report on the Chinese Nuclear Industry.

26 June, 2008 Posted by | China Energy, China Future | , , , , , , | 4 Comments

Futurecast (Part II): Russia and India

In this continuation of my review of Robert Shapiro’s Futurecast, I analyze his discussion on why Russia, India, and other countries will fail to achieve China and United States’ levels of growth in the coming ten to twenty years.

SHOULD THE WORLD BE CONCERNED ABOUT RUSSIA AND INDIA?

Shapiro discusses why Russia and India will not be able to match the United States or China in relative successfulness. He points out India is ranked 118th in the world for literacy.

Additionally, the Indian economy is still greatly underdeveloped. 60% of Indian labor is based in agriculture, and 20% is centered in extremely small, often one-person-businesses due to a regulatory culture with restrictive land policies and subsidies to miniature businesses that impedes business consolidation (101).

In comparison, a little less than 1% of the US’s economy is based in highly productive agriculture, and 43% of China’s workers serve in agricultural fields, all according to the CIA’s World Factbook. 

In 2004, partially due to restrictive government policies, India received only $5.3 billion (2.3%) of the world’s FDI that was sent to developing countries; China received $60.6 billion (over 20%) (162). While this indicates India has potential to grow; the changes in regulatory environment need to come much quicker to encourage such growth.

India’s Democratic society is far less likely to sanction the painful changes than China’s semi-autocratic government permitted to increase efficiency and development. China ended many state pensions, reduced health benefits, and evicted thousands from their homes. Shapiro does not believe India has the political will to carry through similar needed reforms.

Shapiro does not discuss, but it bears mentioning that India also faces a military challenge. With unrest and instability increasing in Pakistan, the chances for an armed confrontation over Jammu-Kashmir and other disputed regions may increase.

Muslim-led terrorist attacks, such as a 2006 train bombing by extremists that killed over 170, have been significant in recent years (See the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor and the CFR report on Indian terrorism for more information; an Indian think tank discusses terrorist violence in India  and points out that the number of yearly deaths have declined from 2002 to 2006, but still over “2,765 people died in terrorism-related violence in India during year 2006.” [Important to note: some violence involved other groups such as the Naxalites])

Shapiro also avoids in-depth discussion of possible China/India and China/United States confrontation in the near future. China and India have been working hard to resolve border disputes, but all disputed land is not yet resolved. Additionally, both have interests in Southeast Asia, and their expanding navies could come into a conflict over operational spaces. A naval confrontation over bottlenecks such as the Strait of Malacca, however, will not be likely until both countries develop their militaries to become true regional powers- something that will elude China until the mid to late 2010s, and which India may not achieve until the 2020s.

RUSSIA

Shapiro argues Russia’s demographic decline (its aging and population decrease) will contribute to a drop in productivity that will be exacerbated by a murky legal environment that could discourage foreign investment and development. Considering how Russia is currently benefitting from $135 a barrel oil, it is becoming much more flush with cash.

But extra cash does not necessarily equate to extra power. Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and other Middle Eastern states have squandered huge oil windfalls in the past without managing to pull their countries out of poverty and into fully sustainable modern economies.

Shapiro’s analysis of Russia could have benefitted from an indepth discussion of the effect that increasing linkages between China and Russia might have in spurring Moscow to faster development.

China/Russia trade was $50 billion in 2007, and Russia is China’s 8th largest trade partner. Chinese FDI in Russia is estimated at only $3 billion in 2006, “less than 5% of total FDI stock in Russia,” according to a report in the China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. However, that amount of Chinese FDI sent abroad still accounts for the 6th highest Chinese foreign FDI received by any country in 2006 (excluding tax havens).

Russia may have the largest FDI ODI (Outward Directed Investments) of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries– valued at $50 billion+ in 2007, but its FDI has yet to have a large positive effect on foreign countries. Russia’s largest investment targets are located in Cyprus (receiving 37.5%), Luxembourg (26.7%), and the United States (6.7%). Of Russia’s allies in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), Armenia and Belarus receive the most investment according to Deutsche Bank, but it would be difficult to argue that either of those countries has become an economic success due to Russian development.

A later analysis will examine the Russian/China energy trade, but the data for Russia/China business and resource trade, according to Deutsche Bank and a China-Eurasia Forum Quarterly report by Libor Krkoska and Yevgenia Korniyenko, indicates Russia’s culture of bureaucratic inertia will disrupt development. Also, Russia’s corrupt business practices have gotten worse, according to Freedom House, which might stunt further development. 

Russia has a long way to go before it can become a viable partner for China, and historical tensions between the countries might yet preclude strong agreement and alliances in the next five to ten years.

RECIPE FOR SUCCESS?

Shapiro lauds slashing corporate tax rates [as was done to good effect in Sweden and Ireland] (33) and convincing workers that “their interest lies in accepting fewer benefits and less economic security from their governments” (32), since “the American and Chinese approaches can sustain themselves over the next generation, while Japan and Europe’s systems cannot” (34).

Shapiro points out that from 1990 to 2006 “the global market share of European manufacturers shrank from 18.5% to just over 14%, while the global market held by American companies rose from 21 to 23%” (183). He cites that the key to growth– he gives Ireland as an example [especially due to its IT and Pharmaceutical industry successes] (201)– is to “open its economy to foreign competition and investment.”

“In 2006, Europe’s major countries accounted for just 10% of world GDP, less than 1/2 of what America produced that year” (176).

Shapiro spends the rest of the book discussing challenges in health care, energy, and the environment, lamenting a possible doomsday-scenario of economic collapse in China coming on $150 a barrel oil. We’ll see how that plays out. China’s Oil Price Freeze discussed some of the tensions threatening to emerge in response to China’s insistence on keeping energy prices stuck at November 2007 levels, and Consequences of China’s Oil Price Hike discussed tensions that might emerge now that China has raised some energy prices.

CONCLUSION

Futurecast offers little new specific for China-watchers and makes a few slightly dubious surface-assertions in regards to Chinese strengths and weaknesses, but that has to be expected from a broad overview. The book is easy to read, and doesn’t make any glaring errors.

If one is reading for a broad and ambitious look at future geopolitics two to ten years down the line, this book is a good read. I would recommend it to a person who is generally interested in China, or anyone who wants to feel happy about the United States’ place in the world community since this book does an excellent job of Pro-America cheerleading.

24 June, 2008 Posted by | Book Review, China Diplomacy, China Future | , , , , , , , , , , , | 1 Comment

Off The Shelf: Futurecast 2020 (Part I)

Futurecast: 2020 argues that only the United States and China will be considered great economic and political powers in 10 to 20 years. Its author, Robert Shapiro (a former Clinton Administration advisor) reaches this conclusion primarily by arguments based on demographics (aging in countries), obligations (European social safety nets will drain their coffers and ability to produce), innovation (Shapiro argues America can uniquely benefit), and business development (Shapiro argues both China and the United States possess good capabilities and regulatory environments).

I will discuss Shapiro’s most provocative statements in an analysis of what the future holds for China and the United States in relation to the rest of the world.

MILITARY

* Shapiro gives a possible warning of future confrontation between China and the US. “Even deep economic relationships do not preclude wars between the parties, once they’re each other’s near peers in military power.” (20) For example, in the “calm” before WWI, world trade was at an all-time high. and yet that trade led to war, and an arms race rather than peace.

China’s military spending budget has increased by double [percentage] digits for 20 consecutive years, this year rising nearly 18% to at least $59.6 billion (There are many estimates of the precise amount of spending since China does not calculate its military spending the same way that other countries tend to calculate theirs; but the important thing is that China is spending AT LEAST this much.)

However, it is unlikely, even given current levels of assumed spending, that China will be able to challenge the US even on a regional scale until around the year 2020 (Zalmay Khalizad discusses it HERE; but Mulvenon, Cordesman of the CSIS, and others have discussed China’s military force at length in full-length books).

But being directly able to match the US tank for tank may not matter since the Chinese are investing a lot in asymmetrical warfare. The most famous book on China’s asymmetrical and military policy is China Debates the Future Security Environment, by Michael Pillsbury. It’s a little out of date (from 2000), but it’s free on the Internet so it is easy to check out. (A slightly alarmist report on Chinese cyberterror from The Guardian is also available.)

ECONOMIC SUCCESS

Shapiro argues that “demographics and globalization will intensify economic inequality almost everywhere” (22); but that the societies with the greatest inequalities will likely be the richest, like China and the United States, since globalization allows returns on investment to rise (22).

Shapiro discusses how China and the United States are best positioned to take advantage of globalization due to their “freewheeling market capitalism” (16) which allows for innovation and can help the countries escape the burdens of aging and social-welfare systems Shapiro argues will plague Europe and lead to a “geopolitical marginalization” (21)… since “Europe has steadily cut its defense capacities and commitments…[it is] likely to be preoccupied politically with the fierce domestic conflicts certain to erupt when that slow growth collides with the tax hikes and spending cuts requried to keep their pension and health-care systems going (21).

Due to these declines, Shapiro argues, Europe will by necessity grow closer to United States whose military can protect Europe and help ensure its steady flow of raw material resources.

OTHER DEMOGRAPHICS

Shapiro touches on China’s aging; but notes that its large population, if properly educated, can mitigate most of the troublesome effects of a declining workforce. Even if China grays, its population is not expected to begin aging until the late 2010s, and at least through the early 2020s, around 75% of the population will be working-age or younger.

Another factor explaining why China’s aging will not necessarily hobble the country, is that unlike most other aging countries; Japan, the US, and Europe, China has not yet reduced the size of its agricultural industy– it still represents around 43% of their labor force. China still has a long way to go on reducing agricultural employment and retooling that employment into more productive industries. Therefore, in terms of raw productive ability, China will be able to benefit from a continually expanding industrial-production pool as more agricultural workers shift into city employment.

However, Shapiro avoids a detailed discussion on China’s environmental or health problems. Considering how he allots much discussion arguing that China and America are strong countries with strong economies in part because they lack national health care, this is a bit confusing.

China’s environmental problems have gradually worsened; 16 of their cities are listed as the 20 most polluted in the world. The preponderance of pollution will lead to more chronic conditions, and more lost-days at work which can cut into productivity. When I lived in Beijing, every year we suffered a few “purple” level pollution days where the air quality index rated worse than 500 parts particulate matter pollution– the highest level measured.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Shapiro discusses the usual things about China developing massive amounts of infrastructure and still having a long way to grow. As a World Bank Report stated in regards to China’s massive infrastructure investments: “Annual capital expenditures for transport, electricity, piped gas, telecommunications, urban water supply and sanitation increased steadily from US$39 billion in 1994, to US$88 billion in 1998, and to US$123 billion (about 8.7% of GDP) in 2003.”

Infrastructure needs to be constructed rapidly to encourage continual expansion of China’s economy. According to the Economist “logistics costs… amount to 18% of GDP in China compared with 10% in America” and “between 2006 and 2010 $200 billion is expected to be invested in railways alone, four times more than in the previous five years. ” It will be interesting to see if China’s government can maintain those levels of investment, given the current global recession.

DIPLOMACY

Shapiro then explains how China’s growth and increasing relevance in international trade and resource transfers will encourage new diplomatic alignments. Shapiro argues that a China and Europe alliance or a China and Russia alliance could pressure America and cause it and its world financial institutions to alter policies (40).

PART II will discuss Russia and India, Recipies for Success, and Conclusions on the book.

Feel free to sound off in the Comments section of this post for your opinions on the book and my analysis.

Futurecast 2020

by: Robert J. Shapiro (Undersecretary of Commerce 1998-2001, Senior economic advisor to the Clinton, Gore, and Kerry Campaigns, cofounder of SONECON LLC.) 2007.

23 June, 2008 Posted by | Book Review, China Environment/Health, China Future | , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments

Consequences of China’s Oil Price Hike

China has finally raised the prices on its oil. It came a bit sooner than I expected, but as I stated in “China’s Oil Price Freeze,” the raise was a lot lower than needs to be done (China’s prices are still 1/4 cheaper than gas in the US and 1/3 cheaper per liter than oil in the UK). The United States’ prices on oil have risen over 50% since December 2007 (based on calculations of average gas prices of 2.71 in 2007, according to the EIA);

China only raised their oil prices 16 to 18%. (In November, they raised prices 11% to confront $80/barrel oil;  China’s oil companies appear to still have a shortfall of $21 dollars per barrel from current prices of nearly $130 a barrel.)

Rising oil prices will affect Chinese stability, inflation, and government openness.

STABILITY

According to Xinhua, the Chinese State news agency: “more subsidies would be offered to farmers, public transport, low-income families and taxi drivers to cushion the crunch of price rises.” According to FT, “the finance ministry said the targeted subsidies would amount to Rmb19.8bn ($2.9bn, €1.8bn, £1.5bn).”

Given  China’s huge trade surplus, the burden of cost can be arguably borne by the government (And the amount of subsidies direct to the people currently is far less than the amount of subsidies ($50 billion plus) the Chinese government would have needed to give to state oil corporations forced to do business at under-market prices. Apparently,  Sinopec was losing money on imports when “the international price exceeded $78 a barrel.”)

The problem with the Chinese government pumping a lot of money into the hands of its poor peasants, however, is that it can lead to inflation. In a similar situation in Indonesia “the [Indonesian] government forecasts inflation will rise to 12% in June — up from 8.96% in April — as the fuel-price increase feeds into the broader economy.”

INFLATION

Remember, in 1989, part of the impetus for the massive protests was runaway inflation, rising unemployment and lowering standards of living. And as Pieter Botellier of the Jamestown Foundation also argued; “the Communists’ defeat of the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war of 1945-1949 was greatly assisted by the run-away inflation of those years, which sharply reduced the popularity of Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China (ROC) government. ”

This is not to say China’s government is in any danger of losing its grip on power– but rising inflation might cause its leaders to look to past lessons of history and react skittishly to the consequences of unrestrained inflation. According to Prof. Victor Shih of Northwestern, this is the highest inflation we’ve seen in China since the mid 1990s. Also according to Shih, there is a current factional dispute in China’s leadership about whether to continue to tighten the monentary supply, or to reevaluate the RMB upward to correct the domestic inflation problem. It’s a complicated situation, and I recommend reading his article for more details.

OPENNESS

In light of increased tensions as a result of upwardly spiraling inflation and energy costs; President Hu Jintao might be encouraged to crack down more on free press and coverage of unrest that will likely emerge as people are able to afford less and less.

The Chinese belief has long been that silencing opposition makes it go away. We’ll see what happens over the coming months.

RESULTS

Due to transportation costs, Chinese food prices will increase even more than the 22% percent they have already appreciated since last year. (In all, according to the BBC, China’s inflation as of April was up 8.5% on the year.) Rising inflation could lead to big problems and the end of 4 kuai (.50 cent) meals that sustain many low-paid migrant workers who labor in the cities and send remittances to their farming families.

Already, there has been a slight decrease in the amount of migrant workers in China’s coastal cities (regrettably, I can’t currently find the Journal article I saw the numbers for this cited in- I will post it as soon as I find it), driving up prices for construction and leading to more inflation. The eventual return of these workers to their villages and second-tier cities might be good for the economy in the long-term as some population stress is removed; but in the short term, their return with big city views, and big city demands for quality of life, these returnees could have big cosmopolitan demands for their local governments- demands that might not be met and could cause social unrest.

IN SUMMARY:

ONE Beijing still needs to subsidize a gap of around $20 in international purchases of oil. Its importing companies are still losing cash, but ultimately China can weather slightly cheaper oil prices than the rest of the world since “average Chinese [domestic] production costs were about $US20 ($21)”. It’s the internationally-bought oil gap that China has to pay for.

TWO China also has to manage the social unrest that will originate due to the rising oil prices. Subsidies to the right populations should take a lot of the bite out of that unrest. Prof. Victor Shih of Northwestern speculates a little on what needs to be done to prop up the Chinese middle and lower classes after gas prices rise. 

THREE There may be citizen-government clashes over the increased oil prices, much as there were in March 2007 during the Yongzhou Mass Incident,  sparked over rising public transportation costs. This could be why public transport costs are being kept steady. (According to the FT, “CSFB, the investment bank, estimates that an 8 per cent increase in fares would add 2.3 percentage points to inflation. “)

FOUR If there are clashes, the government will likely clamp down, and try to keep the media from reporting on negative developments since China does not want to look bad in the year of its Olympics (as noted in my earlier article.) How successful they are remains to be determined.

FIVE And certainly, other reprecussions will be demonstrated, from migrant worker movements, to wage price increases, to possible capital flight from China. Remember, it’s China… Anything can happen.

—-

Also of note: An article on hidden cost of fuel subsidies explains why China needed to reevaluate its oil prices.

And Forbes discusses in more detail the weird situation where one of China’s national oil companies, Sinopec suffered under the system and required billions in state subsidies to prop up its foreign oil acquisitions.

http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens//Industry/2008/06/25/104320.html Also had an interesting article on the possible reprecussions of the price rise on China’s national oil companies.

20 June, 2008 Posted by | China Economy, China Energy, China Future | , , , , , , , , , | Leave a comment