From February 26th through the 27th I attended a symposium at the University of Texas in Austin, TX on China’s Emergence: Effects on Trade, Investment, and Regulatory Law.
Here are some thoughts on the more notable issues raised at the symposium:
Timothy Reif, the incoming General Counsel of the Office of the US Trade Representative, spoke as a private citizen to open the event as its keynote speaker. He expressed a desire for China to “stop manipulating” its currency and to move on currency reevaluation. Currently, China’s currency trades in a limited range of .5 percent daily against the dollar (up from .3 percent daily pre-2007).
Responding to a question, Reif acknowledged that China’s economy and the world’s economy would need time to adjust to a freely-floating regime. He suggested that China might not be prepared to freely float the RMB until perhaps 5-10 years in the future. Still, Reif speculated that if the Obama administration did not push China to take some actions toward reevaluating its currency, then the United States Congress may take aggressive action against China.
Reif’s speculation may be based on fears grounded on prior Senate actions directed against China’s currency valuation. (The following paragraph’s information is supplemental. The issues were alluded to, but not discussed in depth. The summary is provided for readers’ reference.)
In 2005, Senator Schumer introduced a bill in the Senate, S.295, that would impose an additional duty of 27.5 percent on “Chinese goods imported into the United States unless the President submits a certification to Congress that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is no longer manipulating the rate of exchange and is complying with accepted market-based trading policies.” (Thomas.Loc.Gov) That bill was not put to a vote and, even if passed, would have been non-compliant with WTO standards. However, in 2006 and 2007, Schumer and others in the Senate tried again with a bill believed to be WTO-compliant. That bill was the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act of 2007, which was placed on the Senate legislative calendar after passing the Senate Finance committee with a 20-1 vote; but the bill ultimately did not come to a floor vote.
Ultimately, Reif did not indicate support for China to take any particular policy. He expressed no opinion on support for a wider managed band in which the currency could trade, nor for increased disclosure on which currencies are included in China’s market basket. His believes it is imperative that China’s currency appreciate, but at the time and in this venue he could not comment on exactly how the appreciation should be managed.
The most interesting question raised by Reif’s talk was to what degree will US President Obama and the Congress push against China to appreciate its currency during this economic downturn that is negatively affecting both countries. His comments seem to reflect that if America’s economy fails to improve, then domestic pressure will encourage Obama and/or Congress to take significant action to counter “imbalances” caused by China’s currency policy.
(Part III will include commentary on presentations from Raj Bhala (Law Professor at the University of Kansas), and John Greenwald (International Trade Lawyer).
Hugo Chavez and Hu Jintao met on September 24, 2008 and signed 12 cooperative deals dealing with “trade, oil, finance, education, justice, telecommunications, infrastructure, sports and cultural relics” (Xinhua). The economic and oil agreements appear to be the most politically important since Venezuela is aggressively attempting to diversity its options in dispersing its abundant supplies of heavy crude oil.
Below, I explore possible effects of Chavez’s goal to ship 1,000,000 barrels of oil a day to China by 2012.
Amount of Trade / Growing Cooperation.
In 2001, China and Venezuela established a joint trade “committee [that] aims at consolidating and strengthening trade cooperation. “ (Xinhua), which helped China become one of Venezula’s five largest trading partners. The US, Brazil, and Colombia are among the others. China’s money, however, mostly travels toward the EU, the US, Japan, and the ASEAN nations (People’s Daily).
Year on year, China’s trade with Venezuela is steadily increasing. “Bilateral trade in the first seven months reached $6.23 billion, compared with $5.9 billion for all of 2007, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said” (Bodzin and Wang, Bloomberg).
Below is a chart examining the rise in trade between China and Venezuela.
Total Exports to China
Total Imports From China
Oil To China
|2000||>200 million total||from (p202)||—|
|2001||>350 million total
|2002||400-500 million total||from (p202)||—|
|2003||543 million||199 million||—
|2004||738 million||596 million||12,300 b/ day|
|2005||1,234 million||908 million||50,000 b/day (est.)|
|2006||2,622 million||1,698 million||~150,000 b/day|
|2007||3,014 million||2,835 million||200,000 b/day|
|2008||6.23 billion total||Through July (Bloomberg)||364,000 b/day|
|2009 (est)||> 8 billion total||est.||500,000 b/day|
(Unless otherwise indicated, data is from China Daily July 5, 2008; figures in USD.)
“Heavy” New Agreements
In the September 25th agreements, “Hu said China would like to deepen “all-phase and integrated” oil cooperation with Venezuela, encourage businesses to invest in Venezuela and establish a trade zone. China will also participate in building Venezuela’s infrastructures, including railway system, telecommunications network, social housing and hydro-power” (Xinhua). Additionally, China and Venezuela plan to construct two refineries, one in each country (Oil and Gas Journal).
Venezuela hopes to make 1,000,000 barrels/day in oil deliveries to China by 2012. The Venezuelans have been working diligently toward that goal; “In the first 7 months of 2008, Venezuela exported 5.18 million tons, or 38 million bbl, of crude to China—an increase of 93.8% over 2007.” (Oil and Gas Journal).
To facilitate cooperation and investment, China and Venezuela set up the “Joint Financing Fund, also known as the “heavy fund”” in early 2008 with capital of $6 billion (China Daily) [$4 billion of which was provided by China]. On September 25th, the countries agreed to double the investment to $12 billion (Shanghai Daily).
A market research report by Business Monitor International expects Venezuela will increase its 2008 production from 2.75 million b/day in 2008 to oil and gas liquids production of 2.93 million b/d by 2012. Internally, “[c]onsumption is forecast to increase by around 3% per annum to 2012, implying [domestic] demand of 675,000 b/d by this point. The export capability would thus be about 2.26mn b/d by 2012″ (*A).
Crude Predictions / Feasibility
Logistics of shipping the distance from South America to China will be important to overcome. To in-part facilitate this obstacle, “the two have a shipping joint venture that will build the shared very large crude carrier” (Guardian). Still, according to the Heritage Foundation, the largest supertankers cannot pass through the Panama Canal, which increases costs of oil transport from Venezuela to China. Expansion of the Panama Canal should be completed by 2014. Expansion will expand the current locks from “33 metres (108 feet) wide” “The new locks would be 50 metres (150 feet). A third lane of traffic would be able to handle the wider loads” (BBC; also “Brazil’s Passage To China“).
It is important to retain a sense of perspective about Venezuela’s importance to China. China wants Venezuela’s oil, but Venezuela currently supplies only 4 percent of China’s total oil imports, according to a quotation by a Chinese government official on Bloomberg, but from data elsewhere it appears the number is closer to 10 percent. [Forbes clarifies that Bloomberg misunderstood the quotation- China receives 4% of Venezuela's crude exports.] China imports about 46% of its oil needs (Xinhua).
In 2007-08, China mainly imported oil from Saudi Arabia (656,000 b/d, 17.92%of its total oil imports) and Iran (433,000 b/d, 11.83%) among others (Shichor, Jamestown).
In 2006, China’s oil imports mainly came from; Angola (~500,000 b/day), Saudi Arabia (~470,000 b/day), Iran (~350,000 b/day), Russia (~350,000 b/day), and Oman (~220,000 b/day). At that time, Venezuela’s supplies of oil did not even rank among China’s top five suppliers. (Data from the EIA).
Zweig, David and Bi Jianhai’s important article; “China’s Global Hunt for Energy.” (Foreign Affairs. Sep./Oct. 2005. 28.) noted that, as of 2004/5, China had relatively diverse sources of oil imports. China’s largest four oil suppliers accounted for the following percentages of China’s imported oil; Saudi Arabia (14%), Oman (13.3%), Angola (13.2%), and Iran (10.8%)).
Still, China’s oil import demands are rising and were up 14.7% in 2007. Every year, Venezuela supplies greater and greater amounts of oil to China, from a mere 50,000 b/day in 2005 to over 300,000 b/day in 2008.
Consequences. Can Hugo Shift to China?
Hugo Chavez needs other places to sell his oil if he plans to act on his anti-American rhetoric (PINR). Currently, though, the US is very important to Venezuela’s economy. “The U.S. buys about two-thirds of Venezuela’s daily exports of 2 million barrels,” which works out to about 1.3 million-1.5 million b/day (Bodzin and Wang, Bloomberg). As of 2005, over 60% of Venezuela’s oil exports went to the United States and was the United States’ fourth-largest oil supplier (Bajpaee, Jamestown). Interestingly, however, “U.S. imports of Venezuelan oil fell by 11.7 percent to a five-year low in the first four months of the year” (IHT).
The US is Venezuela’s largest trading partner, and Venezuela is the US’s 9th largest trading partner in terms of imports in 2006 and 2007. Venezuela accounted for over 37,000 million in trade in 2006 and 39,000 million in trade in 2007. In 2008, partially due to oil’s price spike, trade was up 58.5% to 32,000 million by July 2008, according to the Industry Trade Association of the US Dept. of Commerce.
China’s purchases of 364,000 b/day from Venezuela is about 1/4th of US purchases. Currently the United States is more attractive for Venezuela to ship to because the US has refineries which can deal with heavy Venezuelan crude, and the United States is much closer and cost-effective for Venezuela to ship toward.
Chavez interestingly claims that “Venezuela won’t suspend crude exports to the U.S. on increased supplies to China” (Bloomberg). If both the Chinese and the Venezuelans make significant investments in developing Venezuela’s oil fields, this will be possible. In fact, “PDVSA hopes that Chinese oil companies [alone] will produce at least 400,000 barrels of crude a day in Venezuela by 2011.”
However, President Chavez’s highly socialist economic policies might cripple indigenous Venezuela PDVSA investment into oil field development and refining. Although Venezuela may intend a “win-win” situation, the reality might turn into a zero-sum game where Venezuela gradually decouples crude shipments away from the United States’ heavy oil refineries (which refine nearly a third of Venezuelan heavy crude), and directs them toward domestic and Chinese refineries.
It is important to note that with expected growth of only 200,000 additional barrels/day expected by 2012, Venezuela may redirect oil and further decouple its economy from the United States in order to meet its self-imposed ship-to-China obligations.
As a result of its closer economic relationship with China, Venezuela appears to be purchasing political “cover.” The less its economy is dependent on America’s, Venezuela can more deeply pursue Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution. It seems this deal mainly benefits Venezuela in its short term goals of independence from American economics.
In the long term, China gains a diplomatic ally, influence in South America, a guaranteed crude supply (because few countries can process Venezuela’s heavy crude), respect as an international economic leader, and gains expertise in heavy crude refining.
* China and Venezuela political relations (until 2003) from China’s Consulate in New Zealand.
* China Daily’s China-Venezuela Special (July 5, 2008).
* Another EIA article on Venezuela, with information on refining capacity (October 2007).
* (Added October 12) Forbes looks at China-Chavez relations (Oct 1, 2008)
(*A) Also of note; “Between 2007 and 2018, we are forecasting an increase in Venezuelan oil production of 23.2%, with liquids volumes rising steadily from 2.72mn b/d to 3.35mn b/d.” Business Monitor International Report.
The Capitalistic country controlled by a Communist Party has free trade agreements with at least nine countries. Below, I give an updated view on current and potential trade agreements.
A more in-depth analysis of cost-benefits of said agreements will have to wait until a later post. If you can’t wait, check out W. McKibbin and Tingsong Jiang and the Brooking’s Institution who did a good study of the impact of current and future trade agreements. Their article was a basis for this one.
* Agreement on goods signed on 29 November 2004 for implementation in Jan 2005;
* Agreement on services signed in 14 January 2007 for implementation in July 2007;
* Agreement on investment under negotiation (McKibbin and Jiang believe this may be concluded by 2010. 10.) However, a more recent article (August 27, 2008) postulates the agreement may be signed as early as December 2008.
* Phase-Out period for normal items ends for China and original ASEAN countries by 2010.
* Phase-Out period for sensitive items ends for China and original ASEAN countries by 2013.
* Phase-Out period for normal items ends for the newer ASEAN members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam.) by 2015.
* Phase-Out period for sensitive items ends for the newer ASEAN members (CLMV) by 2020.
* “According to ASEAN statistics, the trade value between the ASEAN and China increased from 59.6 billion U.S. dollars in 2003 to 171.1 billion U.S. dollars in 2007, growing at an annual rate of 30 percent” (Source).
Australia Under Negotiation
* The tenth round of negotiations was held on 22-26 October 2007.
* Agreement on goods was signed on 18 November 2005 “immediately removing all tariffs on 92 percent of Chile’s exports.”
* Agreement on services signed on April 13, 2008.
* Agreement on services goes into effect on January 1, 2009.
* “[B]ilateral trade soared 65 percent year on year to 14.7 billion U.S. dollars in 2007, up from the 23.9 annual growth of 2006. Last year, Chilean exports to China surged 79 percent to 10.3 billion U.S. dollars, boosted by copper and grape wine trade. Meanwhile, Chinese exports to Chile jumped 42 percent to 4.4 billion U.S. dollars with strong growth in computers and communications technology, electronic products and automobiles” (Xinhua).
East Asian Free Trade Area (of ASEAN+China, Japan, Korea) Under Negotiation
* The Brookings report believes this may be concluded for goods by 2015. 11.
* A services agreement may follow in 2017.
* An investments agreement may follow in 2020.
FTAAP (Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific) Under Negotiation
* The Brookings Report (11) believes that this may happen for goods by 2025.
* Services by 2027
* Investments by 2030.
Gulf Cooperation Council Under Negotiation
* The third round of negotiations was held on 17-18 January 2006.
* A fourth negotiation meeting was held on 19-22 July 2006.
Iceland Under Negotiation
* A third round of negotiations was held on 17-18 October 2007.
* Fourth round: March 2008
* Agreement was signed on 7 April 2008. [Two-way trade between China and New Zealand currently is worth more than $6.1 billion a year, with Chinese exports making up about 75 percent. (IHT)]
* On October 1st, 2008 “tariffs on New Zealand’s exports to China that are currently set at 5 percent or less will be cut to zero” (IHT).
* “31 percent of New Zealand’s exports to China slated for tariff-free status by 2013″ (IHT).
* Dairy and almost all (96%) of NZ’s exports should be tariff-free by 2019.
* Agreement on goods signed on 24 November 2006;
* Went into effect on July 1, 2007 (People’s Daily).
* 36 percent of products will be tariff free by 2010.
* 85 percent of products will be tariff free by 2013, and Phase II begins, with a goal to reduce tariffs on 90 percent of goods.
* Agreement on services under negotiation (Brookings).
* The current agreement already covers investments (People’s Daily).
* “China-Pakistan trade volume exceeded 4.3 billion dollars in 2005, representing a year-on-year increase of 39 percent. The officials said the trade deal could triple bilateral trade to 15 billion dollars within five years” (People’s Daily).
Peru Under Negotiation
* The 2007 Joint-Feasibility Study.
* The second round of negotiations held on 3-7 March 2008.
* A third round was held in May 2008.
* The fifth round was held at the end of August 2008.
* On August 26th, Peru’s foreign minister of trade and tourism stated a belief that negotiations could conclude by November, 2008.
* The first round negotiation was held on 26 October 2006. There were a total of eight rounds.
* On September 4, 2008, negotiations for a full free trade agreement including goods, services, and investments were concluded. The agreement should be signed by October 2008 (International Herald Tribune). [Bilateral trade between Singapore and China was $63.83 billion, in 2007.]
Southern African Customs Union Under Negotiation
* Negotiation started on 29 June 2004
* The 1st Joint Meeting was held on 9-11 January 2008
* The feasibility study on Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) concluded at the sixth meeting on 21-22 October 2007
* A feasibility study concluded on 13 December 2007
* The 4th Joint Meeting was held on 18-20 Febuary 2008.
* December 2007 China Daily article.
* In July 2007, the countries agreed to study the feasibility of a free trade agreement.
From: Page 7 of Brookings report; originally People’s Republic of China Ministry of Commerce news releases; also edited and updated with data inter alia from the Brookings report and from various news sources from around the Internet.
Potential Free Trade Timeline
October 2008 – “[T]ariffs on New Zealand’s exports to China that are currently set at 5 percent or less will be cut to zero” (IHT).
October 2008 – Singapore-China Free Trade Agreement signed.
November 2008 – Peru-China Free Trade Agreement signed.
December 2008 – Agreement on investment with ASEAN signed.
January 2009 – Agreement on services with Chile goes into effect.
2010 – Phase-Out period for normal items ends for China and original ASEAN countries.
2010 – Pakistan: 36 percent of products will be tariff free.
2013 – Pakistan: 85 percent of products will be tariff free.
2013 – Phase-Out period for sensitive items ends for China and original ASEAN countries.
2013 – “31 percent of New Zealand’s exports to China slated for tariff-free status″ (IHT).
2015 – Phase-Out period for normal items ends for the newer ASEAN members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam.)
2015 – ASEAN single-market finally established.
2015 – East Asian Free Trade Area (ASEAN, Korea, China, Japan) for goods.
2017 – East Asian Free Trade Area (ASEAN, Korea, China, Japan) for services.
2019 – Dairy and almost all (96%) of New Zealand’s exports should be tariff-free by 2019.
2020 – East Asian Free Trade Area (ASEAN, Korea, China, Japan) for investments.
2020 – Phase-Out period for sensitive items ends for the newer ASEAN members (CLMV).
2025 – FTAAP for goods.
2027 – FTAAP for services.
2030 – FTAAP for investments.
The BRICs are getting cozier.
In 2007 Brazil finally experienced a trade deficit with China. “Brazil’s official figures show its China-bound exports totaled $10.75 billion in value in 2007, with imports from China reaching $12.62 billion,” according to Xinhua. ” 6 percent of all Brazilian exports went to China last year, while 10 percent of all imports came from China,” according to NPR. Bilateral trade rose 71.7% in 2007. Trade between the two took off between 2000 and 2003, when trade rose five-fold, and then again from 2004-2007 when trade more than doubled (BBC).
In 2007, the United States, Brazil’s #1 trading partner, exported $24.6 billion to Brazil and imported $25.6 billion; however, China may soon supplant the United States and Argentina in trade importance to Brazil.
In Brazil’s July-launched China Agenda program, the Brazilian Foreign Trade Secretary spoke of hopes to triple exports to China by 2010, which would account for $30 billion. This could mean that by 2011, Brazilian-China trade could surpass US-Brazil trade. However, I think that is unlikely, as I explain below.
China Supplies Mfg. Goods, Brazil Supplies Raw Materials
“96 percent of Brazil’s Chinese imports are high-value manufactured goods, 74 percent of its exports to China are low-value commodities such as soybeans and pig iron,” according to the AP.
According to Agenda China, Brazil hopes to increase exports of 619 product lines, including “Brazilian pharmaceutical products, chemicals, plastics, shoes and metals, as well as expanding the array of agricultural goods, through a higher Brazilian presence at trade fairs and through visiting delegations of businessmen” (AP). Brazil currently has three consulates in China. They are located in Beijing, Shanghai, and Xianggang (Hong Kong).
Brazil supplies raw materials China will require, such as iron. However, it is difficult for Chinese ships to reach Brazil, which could feasibly increase transport costs. They only have three options; a sea route (through Panama), another sea route around the tip of South America, or perhaps a land/sea route that would need extensive development before it could be widely feasable.
Of the three, transport through the Panama canal is by far the quickest (by days). The planned increase in Sino-Brazilian trade will make it even more vital that Panama’s expansion of the canal (to serve larger ships) is completed by 2014. (Panama Canal Expansion Proposal)
“The current locks are 33 metres (108 feet) wide, but the new locks would be 50 metres (150 feet). A third lane of traffic would be able to handle the wider loads” (BBC).
There are fears, perhaps over-stated, by some in American Ports, that US ports are not prepared to handle the newer large class of ships that can transverse the channel. If US ports are not dredged deeper, the US will lose a percentage of trade to the Venezuelan, or Brazilian economies.
Given the current fuel-price increases and the necessity of long journeys for goods to be transported from Brazil to China, I consider it doubtful that Brazil will increase exports to China three-fold in the next two years. Although the countries have demonstrated an ability to increase trade, the current economic slowdown and Chinese resource investments in Africa and in Australian companies will make purchases from Brazil of less immediate importance.
Trade will increase, since both countries’ are growing despite global difficulties, both will experience slight drags on expansion due to the global slowdown. This will ultimately make unattainable Brazil’s three-fold growth in trade to China .
After 2014, however, with the Panama Canal’s widening, all bets are off. In those circumstances, Brazil-China trade could certainly increase, perhaps exponentially.
* An interesting blog post from MarketOracle on the Brazil-China trade (crica, Feb 2007)
Beijing continues its quest to fill its increasingly high energy needs since demand is up 8.6% in 2006, which is a staggering amount compared to global growth rates of under 2%. To mitigate the problem, Beijing plans to ambitiously expand natural gas supplies.
China’s natural gas industry is growing at a rapid pace. 2007 saw 23.1% growth and this year, Natural Gas output will “likely hit 76 billion cubic meters,” on around 15% a year growth!).
International agreements signed from 2003-2005 are finally coming on-line, and new agreements are being made. Below, I examine what this can this mean for China’s energy security and future geopolitical purposes.
First, for orientation purposes; 1,200 cubic meters of gas equals about one ton of oil (People’s Daily); or a conversion rate of 8.3×10-4. (Conversions will vary between sources depending on how oil companies rate the density of materials, but for simplification purposes, all numbers below are approximations.)
In 2006, China received 69.6% of its energy from Coal (1.19B tons of oil equivalent in 2006, but 2.5B ”natural” tons of coal are expected to be consumed in 2007)^, 21.1% from Oil (350M tons; 183.7M produced domestically, around 47% imported), 5.8% from Hydroelectric, 2.7% Natural Gas (55.6B cubic meters- in 2007 this rose to 69.8B cubic meters), and 0.8% from Nuclear Energy [data from: Rosen (17), and China Daily (2006)]
To make the data easier to compare, cubic meters have been approximately converted into tons:
* Roughly converted into tons, thus is estimated down from the 69.8B cubic meters as per the formula explained above. Also, Natural gas data is for 2007.
^ 1 m.ton of coal = 4.879 barrels of crude oil equivalent (Source)
(Chart Data from Rosen and China Daily; 2005 and 2006 numbers except as stated.)
(2009-2010) – New Sources of Imports Coming on line
The Chinese government hopes to double use of Liquid Natural Gas from 2.5% of the energy mix (as of 2005) to 5.5% of the energy mix by 2010, and expects to utilize 200B cubic tons a year (166M tons, or roughly half of current oil consumption) of LNG by 2020 (IHT).
China is fast approaching its goals. In order to facilitate foreign imports, pipelines are being built, and China National Offshore plans to build an additional 10 LNG (Liquid Natural Gas)-capable ports (CER).
In August 2007, PetroChina and Chevron agreed to develop the Luojiazhai natural gas fields in Sichuan. The fields are believed to hold 2.03 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves (57,483,144 cubic meters or roughly 48M tons.) (CER).
In July 2008, PetroChina proclaimed “Sulige Gas Field in China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region” can now produce 4.5 billion cubic meters (steres) a year (3.8M tons). By the end of the year, Petrochina hopes to increase output to over 7 billion cubic meters (steres) annually (5.9M tons) (China Institute).
Turkmenistan will be able to export Natural Gas to China, starting in 2009. Under an August 2006 deal, China plans to purchase 30 billion cubic meters in 30 years; averaging to 1 billion cubic meters, or around 833,000 tons a year.
In June 2008, China signed a deal with Qatargas Operating Co. for delivery, starting in 2009, of 2 million metric tons of LNG annually (CER).
TOTAL: (2009) 8.9M tons yearly
Sulige Gas Field (5.9M yearly)  (Inner Mongolia)
Qatar (2M yearly) 
Turkmenistan (833,000 yearly) 
Luojiazhai Fields (43M reserves) [~2010] (Sichuan)
Long Run Forecast
In July 2008, Kazakhstan started a natural gas pipeline (IHT) that should be “completed by June 2010.” When finished, it will carry 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas each year, or around 38M tons.
Sinopec also has high expectations for the Dayi Gas Field in Sichuan. They claim possible natural gas reserves of 100 billion cubic meters (85M tons) (China Institute).
China also, in June 2008, signed a cooperation agreement on natural gas extraction and transportation with Myanmar, which has over 5.7 to 10 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (283,168,199,078 cubic meters; or 238M tons) (China Institute).
In a July 10, 2008 statement, “Russia plans to export 68 billion cubic meters of natural gas to China annually by 2020 [58M tons], the president of the Russian Gas Union said. Valery Yazev, who is also deputy chairman of the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, said that Russia planned to supply up to 30 million metric tons (220 million barrels) of crude oil to China via a branch line of the East Siberia – Pacific Ocean pipeline (ESPO)” (China Institute).
TOTAL: (2020) 96M tons yearly
Kazakhstan (38M yearly) [2010-2015]
Russia (58M yearly) [2015-2020]
Dayi Field (85M reserves) [2010-2012] (Sichuan)
Future pipelines from Kazakhstan will carry imports that equal half the amount of LNG consumed by China this year. As a result, Central Asian security will become more integral to Beijing’s foreign policy. The pipeline from Kazakhstan crosses Uzbekistan and goes through China’s sometimes-volatile Xinjiang province. New pipelines originating from Central Asian countries will require more People’s Armed Police patrols to guarantee safety, which will tie down a modest amount of troops since the lines present an energy security vulnerability. Anti-terror crackdowns will increase in Xinjiang, and possibly Islamic Mosque worship will be more restricted. (Children under a certain age are not allowed in Mosques; although when I visited, it appeared this practice was not entirely enforced.)
Also, Beijing will strengthen ties with the SCO (Shanghai Cooperative Organization) economic and defense grouping of Central Asian states, perhaps attempting to marginalize the United States’ regional influence. Beijing already surpasses the US in trade partner significance to several Central Asian States, trading $12 billion in 2006 (CRS, 71) with the region, compared to 2006 US trade of slightly over $2.3 billion with the region. (Data from HERE, HERE, HERE, HERE, and HERE for exports; HERE for imports)
With a future pipeline to Myanmar, Beijing might increasingly coddle that regime, like France and Russia at times did to Baghdad in the leadup to the Iraq War. However, given Myanmar’s undeveloped economy, it may be years before they practically exploit their natural gas. An Indian and a South Korean company are also involved in the explotation. The Myanmar issue will prove to be a complicated one, geopolitically.
Ultimately, Natural Gas is but one of several sources for China’s energy, and it will only account for 5.3% of Beijing’s energy mix by 2010. Coal is currently, and will remain the most important piece of Beijing’s energy plan for the next twenty years. And oil will remain the most vulnerable part of Beijing’s energy plan, since over 47% of China’s oil demand is imported.
Still, the importance of LNG will cause Beijing to bring in foreign experts (such as Shell, and Chevron), and will increase its influence in the Central Asian states. It will be interesting to see how relations and rights negotiations develop over the next two to ten years, given energy prices’ recent fluctuations.
Also of Note: Daniel Rosen and the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ AMAZING analysis of China’s Energy Future – http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/rosen0507.pdf
Off the Shelf:
While much is often stated of China’s trade surplus with the rest of the world, China actually ran a trade deficit with Latin America for much of the 2000s. China is the continent’s third largest trading partner, after the United States.
Eduardo Lora opens the book with a discussion on whether Latin America should fear China. From the data he presents, the answer appears to be “not yet.” He points out several economic weaknesses faced by China.
1.) Allegedly, China still has poor corporate governance and inefficient state-owned companies. Lora notes that the amount of state-run underperforming assets has massively declined over the years, but he makes much of the nonperforming loans and debt that burdened Chinese banks until restructuring and bank sheet balancing resulted in NPLs at only 9.5% as of late 2006. Considering how flush with reserves, investment and other cash China currently is, and how their companies are modernizing business practices, I do not think corporate governance questions is necessarily a crippling problem for China to overcome with investments in Latin America… especially when compared to indigenous Latin American companies’ problems with inefficiency and corruption.
To back up his assertion, Lora goes on to argue (27) that the three largest firms in main economic sectors are state owned and that China is propping up 30-50% of those firms as “national champions” by giving them loads of state support so they will become globally competitive multinationals by 2010 (27). He argues this will lead to inefficiencies.
For comparison for how strong China’s companies are. As of 2007, China managed to get eight companies into Fortune 500′s World’s Most Admired Companies (The US had 135; Japan, 61; Britain, France, and Germany, 26 apiece) . A good amount of the top companies, however, are state owned. [I find it odd though that Huawei, Lenovo, Haier, Baidu, and Galanz were not listed as admired companies-- a lot can be said for them as Donald Sull (2005) discussed in Made In China.] And indeed, being listed on Interbrand’s listing of Top Global Brands still escapes Chinese companies. As of 2007, China still had no companies on the list (Here’s the report). The Best China brands are examined here. An easy chart of them is here.
2.) Lora gets a bit technical by discussing how China’s financial system is still undeveloped (28-30). Keep in mind though that a lot he discusses as being undeveloped has evolved since his article was written (in late 2006). He complains how until 2006, foreigners could only buy nonvoting B-shares in several sectors (infrastructure, utilities, and finiancials). Now, he says foreigners can purchase A shares, but to ensure stability they are required to buy over 10% of shares and hold for longer than 3 years. Lora argues this lack of easy-foreign investment will eventually damage Chinese companies’ ability to efficiently expand. (Then again, China has a lot of money even within its country, so maybe it will escape these problems.)
3.) Allegedly 50% of GDP (31) is locked up in savings and investments. Lora states this could be good, but it prevents capital and labor from moving to the most efficient sectors.
4.) Lora points out that 40% of private entrepreneurs with companies that have incomes over $120,000 USD are CCP members (31). This could be a neutral comment, or it could imply possibility that corruption rather than efficiency might govern China’s future capital markets.
Lora then discusses weaknesses that are shared between the countries:
5.) Weak higher education. (More on that in a later article)
6.) Corruption/Weak Rule of Law
As of 2007 there were 122,000 Chinese lawyers at one per 10,650 people [In the US the ratio is 1 per 270] (“Chinese Seek a Day in Court”, WSJ, July 1, A12) but most judges are retired from the PLA and lack legal expertise.
I don’t particularly believe Lora’s view that China’s companies are doomed to not meet expectations of world-dominance, since China is confronting many troubles he identifies. However, the points he raises have at times been overlooked by people willing to too-quickly crown China the next world hegemon.
Chapter 2, by Jorge Blázquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodríguez and Javier Santiso discuss whether China’s markets complement or threaten Latin America’s.
China’s export-mix competes the most with Thailand, Hungary, and Mexican goods (53). Costa Rica also, to a lesser degree, faces competition (54).
Brazil and China are highly complementary in trade (55).
In a chart on (54), Santiso excellently documents, through use of his own data tables, how Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Columbia and Argentina have very little competitive overlap with China.
Mexico and China share interest in IT, consumer electronics, clothes, and manufacturing. Transportation equipment is Mexico’s only advantage.
Latin America allegedly has too inefficient ports, so they cannot gain in transport cheapness vis-a-vis China in trade with other countries and regions. Customs are too slow, taking up to seven days on average to clear across the region. However, Latin America will still not be overly burdened by China competition since the two regions specialize in different products.
Latin America, for example, gains in trade to China by sending copper, oil, soybeans, and coffee.
According to the article, “in 2004, 1/2 of Chinese FDI went to Latin America, exceeding the 30 per cent that went to Asia (70).” I’m not sure that’s completely true and will have to consult my other sources, but it bears examining, because it’s quite interesting, given all the media attention lavished on China-Africa relations.
In essence, Santiso concludes that “China will benefit other emerging economies in [Latin America in] the long term.” “Latin America faces few if any short-term trade costs” (55), except in Mexico and Costa Rica, of course.
Chapters 3-5 were okay, but didn’t reveal too much of immediate interest. The pamphlet-book is a good read, and I’ll recommend it even though it is fast getting out of date. There simply aren’t that many good articles/books written on China-Latin America relations, but of the ones that do exist, Santiso’s is certainly a gem.
* Mohan Malik, writing for PINR has a digestable version of Sino-Latin American Relations.
* There is a 2005 CRS Congressional report on China’s influence in Latin America.
* PBS had a radio program on China-Latin America ties. One Brazilian disagreed with Santiso’s statement that China benefitted the Brazilian economy. He called attention to textile competition.
China’s total direct investment stock in Africa accounted for only 1% of global foreign direct investment in Africa, as of 2007 according to the US Department of State (Keep in mind though, as an earlier article stated, this number probably does not include Hong Kong assets invested in Africa- the US Government needs to get on the ball about that). But by other measures, China-Africa cooperation is increasing exponentially.
Bilateral trade between China and Africa rose from $10 billion in 2000 to $70 billion in 2007, making China Africa’s second largest trading partner after the United States. This rise in influence has led to a spate of articles in recent years focusing on China’s interest in Africa. The topic is broad, and would require pages upon pages to properly evaluate.
However, one particularly intriguing aspect of Chinese involvement in Africa that can be focused on are their relations with South Africa- one of Africa’s leading states. In recent years China has benefitted from resource agreements with South Africa and the number of Chinese living in South Africa has risen almost exponentially. So here I examine to what extent China is benefitting from South Africa, and vice versa.
China-South Africa Trade Ties
“Trade between SA and China stood at $9.9bn last year , which represented a 36% increase on the previous year,” according to a Chinese trade minister quoted on AllAfrica.com. In 2007, trade between the two rose to over $11.2 billion.
“South African imports of Chinese products [were] valued at $7.5 billion (R49.1 bn) and South Africa exports to China valued at $3.64 billion (R23.7 bn) in 2007,” according to the Jamestown Foundation.
South Africa “has become China’s main trading partner in Africa over the past few years — its trade with China accounts for more than 5% of total Sino-African trade — and ranked 21st on the list of the Asian giant’s trading partners worldwide.”
Chinese in South Africa
In June, South Africa put its Chinese citizens on an equal footing with its black and Indians by classifying Chinese as “black people,” according to the BBC. This classification allows ”ethnic Chinese [to] benefit from government policies aimed at ending white domination in the private sector.” According to Sky Canaves of the WSJ China Journal, however, this will only directly benefit the 10,000-12,000 Chinese who were citizens of South Africa in 1994, and their descendants. If this is true, the declaration will not directly benefit the Chinese who are foreign investors in South Africa, merely the residents.
According to the Jamestown Foundation, South Africa has nearly 300,000 Chinese living there as of 2007. This implies an exceedingly huge post-1994 immigration of at least temporary Chinese to the country.
Chinese Investments in South Africa & South African Investments in China
China’s investments in South Africa are mainly centered around acquisition of resources. Even the ballyhooed purchase of a stake in a South African bank had some link to resource-driven investment.
In November 2007, ICBC Bank of China agreed to purchase a 20% stake in South Africa’s Standard Bank Group. The stake is valued at $5.6 billion and is one of the largest foreign acquisitions ever made by a Chinese company. As a result of the purchase, according to the Economist “ICBC will get access to Standard Bank’s extensive banking network in 18 countries across the continent—not to mention its expertise in commodities.”
According to Keith Campbell of Mining Weekly, “the Chinese companies involved in South African mining are Sinosteel, East Asia Metals Investment (a subsidiary of Sinosteel), Jiuquan Iron & Steel (Jisco), Minmetals and Zijin Mining.” In African nations, China only has more companies (6) active in the Congo. These companies in South Africa account for millions in investment.
According to the World Bank book Africa’s Silk Road, South Africa is the leading African exporter to China of Iron ore (94.03%), Diamonds (99.27%), Iron or steel coils (100%), Platinum (100%), Aluminum and alloys (99.8%), Acrylic alcohols (100%), Ferro-alloys (99.99%), Copper ores and concentrates (40.67%– Tanzania accounts for 39.74%), and Aluminum and Aluminum alloys (100%). South Africa is second in provision of Copper and copper alloys at (29.25% to Zambia’s 48.36%). (Percentages in the paragraph were listed as a percent of total African trade to China compared to other African countries’ trade between 2002-2004.)
In February, Sinosteel invested an additional $440 million in investment in its South African Joint venture, Sinosteel South Africa Chromium Industry Co., Ltd. (founded 1996) in which it owns a 60% equity stake.
Sinosteel also has a 50-50% joint venture with Samancor established in 2006 and called Tubaste Chrome. At the time, the JV was valued at $230-million. The JV produces 280,000 to 300,000 tons of chrome a year.
Sinosteel’s subsidiary “East Asia Metals owns 60% of Asa Metals, the other 40% being held by Limpopo Economic Development Enterprise.”
China additionally entered into an agreement with Sasol, the world’s largest maker of coal to oil, to build a coal-to-oil plant. It should be completed by 2014 and produce 80,000 barrels a day.
The investments of the other companies are more thoroughly discussed HERE. In general, it appears that Chinese investments into South Africa are accelerating, but still represent only a small part of China’s foreign investment, and a small percentage South Africa’s foreign market. (40% of trade and billions in investment is accounted for by the EU-which, by use of a crude currency calculation came out to $38 billion US in two-way trade; calculated from a stated $300 billion Rand). This would make China’s two-way trade account for just under 10% of total SA foreign trade.
In 2006, South African companies made over $200 million in investments in China, according to the Jamestown Foundation. According to China Daily, the amount was $700 million. Leading investor companies included SAB-Miller, Sasol, Anglo-American, and Kumba Resources.
Both China and South Africa have urged restraint in involvement in Zimbabwe’s electoral chaos, and in dealing with Sudan. This conjunction of aligned views on the international system and beliefs about the supremacy of state sovereignty can bring the two countries closer together. Chris Alden, writing for the Jamestown Foundation, discussed this fact.
* The high rate of crime in South Africa can deter many Chinese investors, as both the Jamestown Foundation and a Chinese official, Zhou Yabin, can attest. People’s Daily had a February 2006 article on the rising crime against Chinese nationals.
Crime in South Africa took at least 14 Chinese lives in 2006. In December 2006, overseas Chinese “established a special fund designed to protect their security in the country… The fund will be used to award police, detectives and informers, who make contributions in solving cases.”
* The Jamestown Foundation also believes that if Jacob Zuma eventually succeeds President Thabo Mbeki in South Africa, that China relations might degrade. Zuma is said to listen closely to labor unions which tend to oppose immigrant China labor and China-run businesses. That being said, Zuma is reaching out to China, in June visiting the country. And Zuma has previous experience with China, co-chairing at least one bilateral commission with China’s top leaders in 2004. Concerning Zuma’s apparent interest in China, and China’s willingness to at times cater to the South Africans (Such as when China imposed voluntary textile export restraints) it appears that unless there is massive anti-Chinese backlash among South Africa’s citizenry, Chinese investments will continue to benefit SA, and SA resources will continue to benefit China.
* Other challenges are a possible trade protectionist backlash that could manifest against the Chinese. Planning for a South Africa-China Free-Trade pact agreement might fall through, or indeed it could become too successful and China-South Africa trade might become too unbalanced and threaten South Africa’s indigenous manufacturing industries, textiles, and communications technology.
It appears China-South Africa ties can continue to accelerate, especially given Beijing’s penchant for investing abroad in resources. But it bears remembering that they will have to compete with the US and the EU, which is currently a larger player in South Africa’s economic policy.
* China Daily’s timeline of China-South Africa relations 1998-2003.
* Chris Alden’s excellent article on China-South Africa relations.
In this continuation of my review of Robert Shapiro’s Futurecast, I analyze his discussion on why Russia, India, and other countries will fail to achieve China and United States’ levels of growth in the coming ten to twenty years.
SHOULD THE WORLD BE CONCERNED ABOUT RUSSIA AND INDIA?
Shapiro discusses why Russia and India will not be able to match the United States or China in relative successfulness. He points out India is ranked 118th in the world for literacy.
Additionally, the Indian economy is still greatly underdeveloped. 60% of Indian labor is based in agriculture, and 20% is centered in extremely small, often one-person-businesses due to a regulatory culture with restrictive land policies and subsidies to miniature businesses that impedes business consolidation (101).
In comparison, a little less than 1% of the US’s economy is based in highly productive agriculture, and 43% of China’s workers serve in agricultural fields, all according to the CIA’s World Factbook.
In 2004, partially due to restrictive government policies, India received only $5.3 billion (2.3%) of the world’s FDI that was sent to developing countries; China received $60.6 billion (over 20%) (162). While this indicates India has potential to grow; the changes in regulatory environment need to come much quicker to encourage such growth.
India’s Democratic society is far less likely to sanction the painful changes than China’s semi-autocratic government permitted to increase efficiency and development. China ended many state pensions, reduced health benefits, and evicted thousands from their homes. Shapiro does not believe India has the political will to carry through similar needed reforms.
Shapiro does not discuss, but it bears mentioning that India also faces a military challenge. With unrest and instability increasing in Pakistan, the chances for an armed confrontation over Jammu-Kashmir and other disputed regions may increase.
Muslim-led terrorist attacks, such as a 2006 train bombing by extremists that killed over 170, have been significant in recent years (See the Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor and the CFR report on Indian terrorism for more information; an Indian think tank discusses terrorist violence in India and points out that the number of yearly deaths have declined from 2002 to 2006, but still over “2,765 people died in terrorism-related violence in India during year 2006.” [Important to note: some violence involved other groups such as the Naxalites])
Shapiro also avoids in-depth discussion of possible China/India and China/United States confrontation in the near future. China and India have been working hard to resolve border disputes, but all disputed land is not yet resolved. Additionally, both have interests in Southeast Asia, and their expanding navies could come into a conflict over operational spaces. A naval confrontation over bottlenecks such as the Strait of Malacca, however, will not be likely until both countries develop their militaries to become true regional powers- something that will elude China until the mid to late 2010s, and which India may not achieve until the 2020s.
Shapiro argues Russia’s demographic decline (its aging and population decrease) will contribute to a drop in productivity that will be exacerbated by a murky legal environment that could discourage foreign investment and development. Considering how Russia is currently benefitting from $135 a barrel oil, it is becoming much more flush with cash.
But extra cash does not necessarily equate to extra power. Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, and other Middle Eastern states have squandered huge oil windfalls in the past without managing to pull their countries out of poverty and into fully sustainable modern economies.
Shapiro’s analysis of Russia could have benefitted from an indepth discussion of the effect that increasing linkages between China and Russia might have in spurring Moscow to faster development.
China/Russia trade was $50 billion in 2007, and Russia is China’s 8th largest trade partner. Chinese FDI in Russia is estimated at only $3 billion in 2006, “less than 5% of total FDI stock in Russia,” according to a report in the China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly. However, that amount of Chinese FDI sent abroad still accounts for the 6th highest Chinese foreign FDI received by any country in 2006 (excluding tax havens).
Russia may have the largest FDI ODI (Outward Directed Investments) of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries– valued at $50 billion+ in 2007, but its FDI has yet to have a large positive effect on foreign countries. Russia’s largest investment targets are located in Cyprus (receiving 37.5%), Luxembourg (26.7%), and the United States (6.7%). Of Russia’s allies in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), Armenia and Belarus receive the most investment according to Deutsche Bank, but it would be difficult to argue that either of those countries has become an economic success due to Russian development.
A later analysis will examine the Russian/China energy trade, but the data for Russia/China business and resource trade, according to Deutsche Bank and a China-Eurasia Forum Quarterly report by Libor Krkoska and Yevgenia Korniyenko, indicates Russia’s culture of bureaucratic inertia will disrupt development. Also, Russia’s corrupt business practices have gotten worse, according to Freedom House, which might stunt further development.
Russia has a long way to go before it can become a viable partner for China, and historical tensions between the countries might yet preclude strong agreement and alliances in the next five to ten years.
RECIPE FOR SUCCESS?
Shapiro lauds slashing corporate tax rates [as was done to good effect in Sweden and Ireland] (33) and convincing workers that “their interest lies in accepting fewer benefits and less economic security from their governments” (32), since “the American and Chinese approaches can sustain themselves over the next generation, while Japan and Europe’s systems cannot” (34).
Shapiro points out that from 1990 to 2006 “the global market share of European manufacturers shrank from 18.5% to just over 14%, while the global market held by American companies rose from 21 to 23%” (183). He cites that the key to growth– he gives Ireland as an example [especially due to its IT and Pharmaceutical industry successes] (201)– is to “open its economy to foreign competition and investment.”
“In 2006, Europe’s major countries accounted for just 10% of world GDP, less than 1/2 of what America produced that year” (176).
Shapiro spends the rest of the book discussing challenges in health care, energy, and the environment, lamenting a possible doomsday-scenario of economic collapse in China coming on $150 a barrel oil. We’ll see how that plays out. China’s Oil Price Freeze discussed some of the tensions threatening to emerge in response to China’s insistence on keeping energy prices stuck at November 2007 levels, and Consequences of China’s Oil Price Hike discussed tensions that might emerge now that China has raised some energy prices.
Futurecast offers little new specific for China-watchers and makes a few slightly dubious surface-assertions in regards to Chinese strengths and weaknesses, but that has to be expected from a broad overview. The book is easy to read, and doesn’t make any glaring errors.
If one is reading for a broad and ambitious look at future geopolitics two to ten years down the line, this book is a good read. I would recommend it to a person who is generally interested in China, or anyone who wants to feel happy about the United States’ place in the world community since this book does an excellent job of Pro-America cheerleading.
The April 2008 CRS American government report I mentioned before in “China’s Soft Power“ dredged up some good statistical data regarding China’s economic reach. However, the CRS analysis fell flat by not including Hong Kong’s FDI in the full calculation of China’s FDI and influence on foreign countries.
China’s 2007 stock of FDI abroad is either $93.7 billion (according to the CIA), or $73.3 billion (according to the report; CRS, 22) or $292 billion (according to UNCTAD); but if you add Hong Kong there is an additional $534 billion or $769 billion in FDI stocks to be accounted (according to the CIA and UNCTAD respectively), or $43 billion in same-year 2006 FDI flows, according to UNCTAD.
Because Hong Kong’s FDI is omitted, the CRS report understates much of China’s world-wide influence.
Of course, much of Hong Kong’s $534 billion in FDI is reinvested back in the mainland.
Many factors can be evaluated when considering China’s worldwide economic influence. Here, I highlight two main ideas touched on in the report; China’ Foreign Trade, and its FDI.
China’s main trading strengths are with countries bordering it such as Japan, South Korea, Central Asia, ASEAN, and Pacific Island Countries. Its total trade with Pacific Island Countries was $754 million in 2006, compared to $404 million by the United States, $3.7 billion by Australia, $918 million by Japan, and $832 million by the EU-25 countries (CRS, 36).
“[I]n 2007, China’s total trade with ASEAN was 17% larger than total U.S. trade ($200.6 billion versus $171.7 billion). China’s exports to ASEAN in 2007 were 55.6%” greater than United States’ exports to the region, while U.S. imports from ASEAN were 2.6% greater than China’s imports (CRS, 91).
“Based on the fact that China’s imports from ASEAN in 2007 grew by 21.1% (over the previous year), versus 12.4% for the United States, it is likely that China’s imports from ASEAN will be larger than U.S. imports [from the region] in 2008. China ran a $14.1 billion trade deficit with ASEAN, while the U.S. trade deficit totaled $50.6 billion” (CRS, 91).
China’s trade with Japan was $210.7 billion in 2006; Japan’s amount of trade with the US was $213.5. The trend in trade indicates China is probably now Japan’s number one trading partner (CRS, 43). Japan receives 9.5% of China’s exports.
China’s trade was greater that US trade with South Korea in 2006. China-SK had $118.1 billion in bilateral commerce, compared to America’s $76.9 billion in bilateral commerce with the peninsular state (CRS, 44). China’s trade with the country is rapidly accelerating and currently accounts for 4.6% of China’s exports (CRS, 45).
China’s trade with Central Asia was $12 billion in 2006 (CRS, 71), accounting for 1.34% of Chinese export trade (CRS, 72). In 2003, US trade with Central Asia amounted to $1 billion. In 2006, the United States imported $1.3 billion from the 5 Central Asian states and exported around $927 million to them (Data from HERE, HERE, HERE), HERE, and HERE). for a total of around $2.3 billion; dwarfed by China’s trade with the region.
WHERE THE UNITED STATES’ TRADE INFLUENCE REMAINS STRONG
In contrast, the United States still trades more with Latin America and Africa, two regions often identified as places where China might eventually challenge the United States’ trade dominance.
“China’s overall trade with LAC [Latin American Countries] grew to about $70 billion in 2006, representing just 4% of its overall trade. In comparison, U.S. trade with Latin America and the Caribbean amounted to almost $555 billion in 2006″ (CRS, 26).
“From 2001–2006, the absolute value of U.S. goods trade with Africa, at $71 billion, was greater than that of Sino-African trade, but Chinese-African trade grew at a much faster rate than U.S.-African trade.” Then again, it had a longer way to rise. “China’s total trade with sub-Saharan Africa rose from $8.92 billion to $45.35 billion in that period, an increase of 409%, as compared to a 152% rise in total U.S.-African trade” (CRS, 119).
WHAT EFFECT DOES CHINA’S RISING TRADE HAVE?
China’s growing influence in trade with its Asian neighbors could lead to future trade embargoes and conflicts such as the 2001 mushroom/automobile trade war between China and Japan. This began when Japan placed a tariff on Chinese leeks and mushrooms. In return, the Chinese imposed oppressively high tariffs on Japanese cars, mobile phones, and air conditioners. The Japanese eventually backed off. It is important to note, however, that the mushroom trade war happened before full Chinese ascension to the WTO. Now that China is part of the WTO (since November 2001) and greater integrated into the world financial system, such trade wars might be less likely to occur.
US-CHINA TRADE & THE TRADE DEFICIT
The United States received, in 2006, 21% of China’s exports (CRS, 45). “In 2007 the United States incurred a merchandise trade deficit of $256 billion with China, $83 billion with Japan, and $13 billion with South Korea (43% of the total U.S. trade deficit of $816 billion) (CRS, 60).
As earlier noted; estimates of China’s FDI investments in foreign countries might be incorrect due to non-inclusion of Hong Kong FDI numbers into the CRS report.
From existing data, it appears China’s FDI sent abroad is relatively low.
“From 2002–2006, U.S. FDI flows to ASEAN were $13.7 billion (or 8.0% of total), making the United States ASEAN’s 4th largest source for FDI. Over this period, China’s FDI totaled $2.3 billion or 1.3% of total, making China the 10th overall source of ASEAN’s FDI” (CRS, 95). “The United States remains ASEAN’s 2nd largest trading partner (China ranks 5th) and its 4th largest source of foreign direct investment (China ranks 10th)” (CRS, 102).
“While China’s reported cumulative stock of FDI in [Latin America] amounted to $11.5 billion in 2005, the cumulative stock of U.S. FDI in the region amounted to $366 billion in 2005, and grew to $403 billion by 2006″ (CRS, 26).
Considering the difficulties of analysis; rather than getting into a deeper blow-by-blow analysis of China’s FDI around the world, I’ll point out an interesting point.
According to the UN; US and Japan’s year 2005 FDI into China accounted for $95 billion, which is $22 billion more than China’s total 2006 FDI invested everywhere in the world (CRS, 47). Using those numbers, it still appears that foreigners are developing and affecting China more than China is developing and affecting the world.
At least that’s how it is for now, anyway.
There’s a lot more to read in the US Government report, from a discussion on Sino-Japanese-Korean relations, to analyses of how the Taiwan issue affects international relations and of China’s energy diplomacy and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), to in-depth discussion of international loans and trading and nuanced explanations of where China’s FDI is heading and why.
Despite its flaws, the report is still well worth checking out.
* Also of Interest: UNCTAD’s World Investment Report: 2006
If John McCain, the presumptive American Republican Party presidential candidate wins in November 2008, his China policy appears to be one of seeking to maintain positive relations while attempting to convince China to become a responsible stakeholder in international affairs.
McCain’s voting record in the Senate indicates a relatively benign attitude toward China-US relations, but his recent campaign rhetoric indicates he might take a harsher line toward China. Then again, President Bush was harsh on China when he came into office, and that shifted sharply once he came to believe that although it might be popular to malign the country, the US might benefit by cooperating with the Asian state.
The often-quoted Yan Xuetong of “Qinghua University says Chinese-U.S. relations might be more stable under a McCain presidency than with either Democrat.”
I invite you to look below and come to your own conclusions about McCain’s statements on China.
CHINA DEMOCRATIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In (1999), McCain said that “we need not shrink from a strong advocacy of religious and political freedom [in China].” Shades of this statement were echoed McCain’s his April 2008 comments in regard to Beijing’s response to unrest in T*b*t; “If Chinese policies and practices do not change, I would not attend the opening ceremonies… It does no service to the Chinese government, and certainly no service to the people of China, for the United States and other democracies to pretend that the suppression of rights in China does not concern us. It does, will and must concern us.”
(All three Presidential candidates echoed similar statements regarding attendance of the opening ceremonies.)
McCain went on to urge China to engage in “a genuine dialogue” with T*b*ts spiritual leader. McCain said: “I have listened carefully to the D@l&i L&ma, and am convinced he is a man of peace who reflects the hopes and aspirations of T*b*t*ns.” He went on to say, “I urge the Chinese authorities to ensure peaceful protest is not met with violence, to release monks and others detained for peacefully expressing their views and to allow full outside access to T*b*t.”
DIPLOMACY AND ECONOMICS
He promotes economic engagement with China (1999), and voted for normalized trade relations with China in 2000. He appears to be a “free trade” Republican who believes that lowering barriers will increase democratization, make others wealthy and lead to peace. It appears McCain subscribes to the Thomas Friedman’s “Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention” (Scroll down to see the definition).
However, in recent years, his statements in regards to China have turned more belligerent. In response to unsafe toy scandals in April 2008 McCain said “If I were president of the United States, the next toy that came into this country from China that endangered the lives of our children, it would be the last,”
McCain also implied that “the G-8 should be limited to democracies,” according to a Bloomberg article reposted on The China Post, which implies he would keep China, and Russia out of the world’s major economic decisions. The economic and political wisdom of keeping some of the most powerful economic powers away from the discussion table is a bit murky. Perhaps pressure-tactics might encourage a change in attitude by the countries- but that remains to be seen.
It appears McCain is willing to confront Beijing on issues such as their support for Myanmar (Burma) and China’s continued trade dealings with Sudan. As he said in May 2008, “”I would hope” Americans would sell stocks and other investments tied to Sudan, McCain told reporters… “because I think that government obviously is one that has done virtually nothing to prevent the genocide that is taking place in Darfur.”
His comments are a bit odd, coming as they did soon after China sent over 140 engineers and troops to Sudan, but it is a fact that China’s promotion of Sudan’s “national sovereignty” has resulted in it pushing for watered down UN votes sanctioning Sudan over its treatment of the minorities in the Darfur region.
CHINA AND TAIWAN
“Guarding against Chinese threats to our strategic interests in Asia is a sound rationale for helping reduce the growing threat to Taiwan from a mainland missile attack” (1999).
Considering McCain’s interest in East Asian security, it is likely he will support the continued de facto independence of Taiwan. He would unlikely, however, support de jure independence, seeing as he has previously spoken of a “One China” principle.
John McCain appears willing to challenge China on shoddy imports, and human rights. He also appears willing to seek to maintain American military interests in the region and may subscribe to a view that America’s long-term world-competitors are large states rather than small. This would encourage him to expand the size of the professional military, and perhaps purchase a larger amount of F-22s.
If McCain speaks most belligerently about China, it will be in regards to T*b*t, or Taiwan. While he has been noted for his compassion for the Sudanese people, beyond the stock sell-off he has had little to say directly on the subject.
Of course, American forces in East Asia are currently being drawn down as troops are moving gradually from South Korea to Guam. The drawdown of US troops could ameloriate Chinese fears of American encirclement.
McCain would try to keep the trade levers open between the countries, believing trade would be mutually beneficial. McCain’s past record is of promoting economic policies that satisfy China, and benefit America by creating a more efficient supply-chain. These policies do much toward peacefully co-existing with the Chinese State.
It appears that a McCain presidency, though potentially confrontational in regard to Chinese human rights and shoddy merchandise, would tend to reflect George Bush’s status quo of criticising China, while still increasing trade, and working toward dialogue. That is, if the OLD free trade McCain overcomes the populist G-8 and dialogue-limiting McCain that has appeared in the 2008 election cycle. If the new, more belligerent McCain crafts China policy, then pressure and stresses might develop in the Sino-US international relationship.
* The major source article for this analysis was the CFR’s analysis of Presidential Candidates’ China views.
* John McCain’s major foreign policy article in Foreign Affairs is “An Enduring Peace Built on Freedom.”